RED Cross says that the three keys to preparedness are to build a kit, make a plan, and be informed.

An emergency preparedness kit should include enough supplies for at least three days. Supplies should include water (one gallon, per person, per day), nonperishable food, a flashlight, battery-powered or hand-crank radio, extra batteries, a first aid kit, a 7-day supply of medications, a multi-purpose tool, sanitation and personal hygiene items and copies of important personal documents. The Red Cross also recommends having at least two weeks worth of supplies at home.

All members of the household should work together on an emergency plan. Each person should know how to reach other members of the household. The plan should also include an out-of-area emergency contact person, and where everyone should meet if they can’t go home.

People should be informed about what types of disasters are most likely to occur where they live. It is also important to take a first aid and CPR/AED course—a vital component of disaster preparedness in case emergency help is delayed.

The American Red Cross says that it is ready to respond to Hurricane Earl from North Carolina to New England. Red Cross is preparing to open shelters and feed those affected by the storm. On East Coast, the Red Cross is working with various state, county and local government officials to determine what their areas will need. Emergency planning is taking place in North Carolina, South Carolina, New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine.

Red Cross has 14 shelters ready to open with more than 80 additional shelter sites identified if needed. 150 Red Cross mobile response vehicles are on alert.

The Red Cross has four warehouses stocked with relief supplies are on stand-by, and two trailers of relief supplies are en route to North Carolina, carrying clean-up kits, tarps, work gloves, comfort kits, and trash bags.

The effected areas are Beaufort, Bertie, Camden, Chowan, Columbus, Craven, Currituck, Dare, Gates, Hyde, New Hanover, Onslow, Pamlico, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Pitt, Tyrrell, and Washington Counties.

FEMA has designated Michael Bolch as the Federal Coordinating Officer for Federal recovery operations in the affected area. Bolch says that additional designations may be made at a later date after further evaluation. FEMA has also prepositioned commodities for rapid delivery, including water, meals, tarps, blankets, generators and other essential items.

Assistance for the State and Affected Local Governments Can Include as Required:

* FEMA is authorized to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act, to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the designated areas.
* Specifically, FEMA is authorized to provide emergency protective measures (Category B), including direct Federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program at 75 percent Federal funding.

The Rewards for Justice Program has announced a five million dollar reward for any information leading to the arrest of Mehsud or Rehman. Additionally, the Department of Justice has filed an arrest warrant for Hakimullah Mehsud and charged him with conspiracy to murder U.S. citizens abroad and conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction.

TTP is a Pakistan-based terrorist organization that has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against Pakistani and U.S. interests. Hakimullah Mehsud has been the leader of TTP since August 2009 and Wali Ur Rehman is the TTP Emir in South Waziristan. Rehman has participated in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan against U.S. and NATO personnel, as well as attacks against Pakistani security forces.

TTP has carried out numerous attacks against U.S. interests under Mehsud and Rehman’s leadership. Such instances include a December 2009 suicide attack on a U.S. military base in Khowst, Afghanistan, which killed seven U.S. citizens, and an April 2010 suicide bombing against the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan, which killed six Pakistani citizens.

TTP and al-Qa’ida have a symbiotic relationship; TTP draws ideological guidance from al-Qa’ida, while al-Qa’ida relies on TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border. This mutual cooperation gives TTP access to both al-Qa’ida’s global terrorist network and the operational experience of its members. Given the proximity of the two groups and the nature of their relationship, TTP is a force multiplier for al-Qa’ida.

TTP is suspected of being behind the 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Most recently, TTP claimed involvement in the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate an explosive device in New York City’s Times Square on May 1, 2010. TTP’s claim has been validated by investigations which revealed that TTP directed and facilitated the plot.

The various actions taken today against TTP support the U.S. effort to degrade the capabilities of this group. We are determined to eliminate TTP’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks and to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat their networks. “Faisal Shahzad’s attempted attack on U.S. soil highlights the direct threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban,” said the Department of State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin. “Today’s actions put the TTP and its sympathizers on notice that the United States will not tolerate support to this organization, which has inflicted great harm to U.S. and Pakistani interests. TTP’s destabilizing effect in Pakistan’s tribal areas has resulted in innumerable civilian deaths and considerable property losses. It has greatly, indeed unacceptably, complicated the efforts to counter the threat posed by al-Qa’ida.”

Obama has so far pulled back 100,000 U.S. troops and turned over to Iraq the bases. Obama has promised to pull out the balance end of next year. He says that its consistent with agreement with the Iraqi government. Fewer than 50,000 troops are now left in Iraq.

“Ending this war is not only in Iraq’s interest — it is in our own. Our nation has paid a huge price to put Iraq’s future in the hands of its people. We have sent our men and women in uniform to make enormous sacrifices. We have spent vast resources abroad in the face of several years of recession at home,” says Obama.

Praising the armed forces, Obama said

“In seven years, they confronted a mission as challenging and as complex as any our military has ever been asked to face.

Nearly 1.5 million Americans put their lives on the line. Many returned for multiple tours of duty, far from their loved ones who bore a heroic burden of their own. And most painfully, more than 4,400 Americans have given their lives, fighting for people they never knew, for values that have defined our people for more than two centuries.

What their country asked of them was not small. And what they sacrificed was not easy.”

Meanwhile, Vice President Joe Biden is in Iraq to participate in a Change of Command and Change of Mission Ceremony. He is expected to meet Iraqi political leaders to discuss the need for conclusion of negotiations on the formation of a new government.

As per The WeatherBug Meteorological Operations Team:

Earl has turned to the northwest and is moving at 14 mph. Its central pressure has remained at 27.76 inches or 940 mb. Earl will continue to take more of a northwest turn through Wednesday and then start to head on a more northerly route. If the northern turn, driven by high pressure moving off the U.S. East Coast, occurs later, the Outer Banks and the Mid-Atlantic could be in Earl`s bulls-eye. Even if it stays offshore, Earl could still trigger flooding and significant beach erosion along the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast Coast as the storm churns up the coast.

Fresh on Earl`s heels a newly formed Tropical Storm Fiona will follow a similar path to Earl. A Tropical Storm Watch has been issued from Cape Fear, N.C. to Surf City, N.C. According to the National Weather Service, tropical storm warnings are in effect for the Turks and Caicos Islands. A warning is typically issued 36 hours before the anticipated first occurrence of tropical storm force winds, conditions that make outside preparations difficult or dangerous. Additional rainfall of 1 to 2 inches is expected today in Puerto Rico, with possible isolated maximum amounts of 12 inches. These rains could cause life-threatening flash floods and mudslides. The Governor of Puerto Rico has issued a State of Emergency.

FEMA says that it has activated the National Response Coordination Center and its Regional Response Coordination Centers in all four of its regional offices in the eastern United States, located in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. FEMA has designated a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and has personnel on the ground North Carolina at the state’s Emergency Operations Center in Raleigh supporting the state, and is mobilizing personnel and supplies along the coast.

STRATFOR has received no confirmation of the rumor, and reports by state-run Chinese media appeared to send strong indications that Zhou is in no trouble at the moment. However, the release of this rumor and its dispersion throughout the public is significant, particularly as the Communist Party of China (CPC) is preparing for a leadership transition in 2012.

Chinese state-run media and official government websites have run several high-profile reports about Zhou, which should be seen as an attempt to refute the rumors. The PBC website published two articles on its homepage reporting on Zhou’s meeting with visiting Japanese Financial Services Minister Shozaburo Jimi during the third China-Japan high-level economic dialogue as well as a meeting with an Italian delegation. Xinhua news agency reported that Zhou told the PBC Party Committee Enlargement meeting on Aug. 30 it should “continue to implement justice and strengthen legislative work in the financial system.” Prior to this news, Zhou appeared at the 2nd annual conference of the heads of the Chinese, Japanese and Korean central banks held on Aug. 3, and his most recent public appearance was Aug. 10 for China’s Financial System Anti-corruption Construction Exhibition.

Zhou is known to have lofty political ambitions and is believed to be a close ally to former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, as well as a core figure for Jiang’s “Shanghai Gang.” There has been no shortage of rumors about Zhou’s possible dismissal in the past five years, as he is believed to be associated with several high-level financial scandals. For example, Zhou was rumored to be under “shuanggui,” a form of house arrest administered by the CPC, during the massive crackdown of Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu in 2006, which was perceived in the country as a crackdown of the Shanghai Gang and part of President Hu Jintao’s effort to consolidate power ahead of the 2007 power transition. There was also a rumor that he might have been detained following the investigation and arrest of Wang Yi, the vice governor of the China Development Bank, along with several other officials in the financial circle. Currently, several financial scandals are still under investigation, and it is likely that Zhou, as PBC governor and one of the most powerful economic players in the country, could be associated with some cases. Therefore, whether or not the rumor is true at this time, the leaking of this news is very likely to be associated with a power struggle within the Communist Party’s economic hierarchy.

“This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR“

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When we speak of Pakistan, ISI, Al Qaeda al Sulbah and Pan-Arab Islamist forces exporting Islamist jihad to South East Asia, it should be kept in mind that degree of involvement, quantum of assistance and manner of participation vitally oscillate between different fulcrums. As a nation state, Pakistan is not engaged in proxy war in the South East Asia region, as it is against India and Afghanistan. In South East Asia Pakistan, ISI and Islamist tanzeems of Pakistan functioned in collaboration with the Al Qaeda al Sulbah, HUJI, JUM and Ahl-e-Hadith (BD) and other local forces like the MLF, ASG and Jemmah Islamiyah. Pakistani, Libyan and Arab Peninsula link is common to almost all the Islamist organisations that gained prominence in the region. Pakistani link is a vital string that garlands the entire region. Pakistan was the training ground, supply base and spiritual hub of the Wahhabi and Salafi Islamists. Indian Deobandi tradition, Saudi Wahhabi influence and Egyptian Salafi fundamentalism has penetrated several layers of the Muslim societies in South East Asia.

The protagonists of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism have expanded their activities in a planned manner in most of the South East Asian countries. The South East Asian Muslim majority countries and the countries having sizeable Muslim population have historically practiced moderation, tolerance and somewhat secular approach in running the affairs of their states mainly because of their recent Hindu past. Especially Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Cambodia and Thailand have encouraged ethnic, religious and linguistic plurality. Indonesia having 95% Muslim population has, however, practiced moderation and accommodative spirit under leaders like Sukarno and Suharto. They had prevented the Islamist parties and organisations from preaching virulent fundamentalist tenets of Wahhabism.

The South East Asian Muslim population developed strong early linkages with the Arab traders and preachers and was influenced by West Asian Islam. However, plurality of ethnic composition and cross-cultural impacts from India and China had modified Islam to a great extent. Sufism, imported from India and Central Asian countries, also went a long way in moderating the impact of purist Wahhabi Islam. Muslims of South East Asia had preserved their historical traditions having roots in Indian and trans-Chinese cultures.

However, historical events indicate that in post-Iran revolution and post-Russian occupation of Afghanistan the Muslim pragmatic rulers of South East Asian countries too succumbed to pressure and started conceding space to the Islamist parties and organisations. On Pakistani and Al Qaeda al Sulbah contribution to the growth of Islamic terrorism in South East Asia we can, therefore, treat the subject in two short themes: growth of Islamic fundamentalism that aimed at destroying moorings of the Muslim peoples to ancient cultural values and growth of International Islamist terrorism.

The Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the ISI did not light the initial torch of Islamisation process in South East Asian countries having sizeable Muslim population. The initial impetus had come from internal political and economic conditions, fear of domination by other religious groups like the Christians, Buddhists and Hindus, and rapid exposure to radical ambience created by Iran revolution and resurgence of Wahhabi Islamic concepts all over the Sunni dominated Islamic countries. Pakistan had started emerging as the most important centre of Wahhabi and Deobandi Islam after Zia-ul-Haq initiated rapid Islamisation of the country and agreed to collaborate with the USA to fight the Red Communist forces in Afghanistan. In addition to fundamentalist production lines in Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, Yemeni and Libyan factories, Pakistani madrassas acted as nurseries where South East Asian fundamentalists were sun burnt in radical Islamism. These fundamentalist fodders did not remain rudderless for a long time. A sizeable numbers of them were recruited by the CIA and Saudi intelligence agency and were sent to Pakistan for brainwashing and training in Pakistani and Al Qaeda al Sulbah camps for fighting against the Soviet backed forces. Most of these jihadis went for the love of money and a good number of them returned as confirmed Islamist jihadists with conviction that they could also establish a compact Islamic nation comprising all the Muslim inhabited states/areas of South East Asia.

The Philippines has witnessed Muslim unrest for over 350 years in the Muslim majority islands of Mindanao, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan and the Sulu cluster of islands. In modern days, the Muslims of the region like to describe themselves as Bangshamoro (Moro nation), indicating that the descendants of the Moors (Arabs) were fused into a compact nation and deserved independence from the Christian Philippines.

The Philippines Muslim National League (1967) carried out political and military struggles, out of which grew the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (SAG). The Moro Islamic Movement (MIM) was formed in 1968 out of anger amongst the Muslims over large-scale Christian migration to the southern islands. The MIM had fought pitched skirmishes with the Christians. They availed of the opportunity of the Philippines opening up to the Muslim countries like Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Libya, where Muslim Filipinos were allowed to migrate as cheap work force. Some Muslim students were also accepted in religious schools of these countries. In 1990 there were about 750 Filipino madrassa students in Pakistan and over 4000 in other Arab countries. These graduates in turn organised madrassas and taught Wahhabi form of Islam. Some teachers from Pakistan and Arab countries were also allowed sabbatical opportunity in the southern Moro islands to teach Islam. By 1971-72, Libya had started financing construction of mosques and madrassas. The Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) also pitched in with adequate support.

Nur Misauri, a professor at the University of the Philippines, had formed the Moro National Liberation Front in 1968. He was supported by a section of Malaysian leadership and Libya. The Bangshamoro People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) organised by him had offered stiff resistance to the Philippines army. After a few reverses Nur Misauri fled to Libya and later took refuge in Pakistan, from where he guided the armed movement and helped the USA/CIA in recruiting Moro volunteers for their Afghan jihad. Following his initiative 450 Filipino Muslim youths were inducted into Pakistani madrassas in Karachi, Lahore region and Peshawar area. Nur Misauri acted as a link between the Filipino mujahideen and the ISI handlers. He was financially supported by the ISI and was located at guesthouses in Peshawar and Karachi.

The MNLF later settled for peace talks with Libyan brokerage. Nur Misauri was confronted by majority of militant members at a meeting of the MNLF at Mecca in 1977. The group wanted autonomy, while Misauri preferred independence. Salamat Hashim, the breakaway leader, formed the MILF under Pakistani patronage. Salamat initially moved his organisation to Cairo and later to Lahore, Pakistan where he established firm contact with the ISI and Islamist organisations like Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad and Harkat-ul-Ansar. Under Pakistani encouragement, Moro Islamic Liberation Front was established in 1984. The ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah trained its members in Peshawar, Quetta and Khowst camps alongside the Afghans, Pakistanis and Arabs. The MILF carried on struggle throughout the regimes of Fidel Ramos, Cori Aquino, and Gloria Arroyo. Though predominantly a Christian country the Philippines did not receive protective shield from the USA, as America was neck deep in strategic bonhomie with Pakistan and the Arab world.

However, the most important face of the Moro revolt is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), formally known as Al Harkat Al Islamiya. It attained serious notoriety and was listed by the USA as a terrorist organisation after September 11, 2001. The Abu Sayyaf Group was originated in Pakistan and Afghanistan, when about 400 Moro youths were inducted to Pakistan’s ISI managed camp at the behest of the CIA and Saudi Arabia for training as mujahideen. Ustadz Abdurazak Janjalani, one of the Moro leaders, and his brother Khaddafy Janjalani had succeeded in befriending Saudi mujahideen Osama bin Laden. They were initially trained at Quetta and Khowst. Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who believed in strict observance of Wahhabi Islamic tenets, headed the Khowst camp. Abdur Rab Rasul acted in conjunction with the Pak JEI supremo and jointly they converted the Filipinos to staunch Islamist jihadis and these elements were known as Abu Sayyaf Group. Janjalanis brought back Wahhabi system to the Moro areas. The group known by Abu Sayyaf had offered full support to the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah sponsored operations in South East Asia and with their help bin Laden had organised Operation Oplan Bojinka. Ramzi Yousef, a Pakistani jihadist, and his associates were designated by the Al Qaeda al Sulbah for blowing up 11 US flights over the Pacific, assassination of the Pope and other spectacular terrorist activities. This sinister plan was hatched up over a prolonged period with meticulous care and planting by long term Al Qaeda al Sulbah residents.

The growth and spread of Islamic terrorism in the Philippines is intricately linked to the concept of exporting Islamic revolution as practised by Libya and Arab fundamentalists and the growth of acute Islamic militancy in post 1978 Pakistan, Afghanistan and other Islamic countries in the Middle East. However, it should be on record that Christian-Muslim conflict in the Philippines was as embedded in the systemic fault line of the group of islands as it was with the Israelis and Palestinians. The Malayan province of Sabah and Libya had provided the initial succour to the MNLF armed insurgency between 1973 and 1975.
The advent of Cori Aquino regime in 1986 signaled a period of negotiation between the MNLF and the government, which led to the formation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), but the MILF continued its programme of sporadic insurgency. The Misauri faction of the MNLF rebelled again in 2001, when he was charged with corruption and other malpractices. He defected with a group of about 500 and attacked government forces at Jolo. He was defeated and was finally brought to trial by Gloria Arroyo government.

The MILF, however, continued the insurgency demanding independent Moro Islamic state. It was supported by the ulema, the datus—traditional aristocrats. Hashim and his deputy Jafar Ghazi visited Malaysia and Indonesia to contact the Jemmah Islamiyah leaders. There are very reliable reports of their visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan seeking support from the ISI, mujahideen tanzeems and Taliban leadership. Pakistan had come to notice, along with Al Qaeda al Sulbah for supplying weapons and explosives to the MILF through Malayan Sabah and Indonesian conduits. Presence of Pakistani and Arab trainers in Mindanao and Sulu archipelago training camps was reported by the US sources. Three retired officers of the ISI were recruited by the spy agency in 1985 and were deputed to Mindanao under cover of religious teachers. In fact, besides the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan the Moro insurgency received attention from PLO, LTTE, Hamas, Iraqi Sunni elements and Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Curiously, a five-member cell of the Abu Nidal group was busted in the Philippines in 1987.

Connectivity of the MILF with Abu Sayyaf Group had started in and around the madrassas in Karachi, Peshawar, Binori, Bannu and Quetta where a large number of Moro students were taught the lessons of Wahhabi and Deobandi Islam, and were indoctrinated with Taliban spirit. A good number of them were also exposed to the training schedule of tanzeems like Lashkar-e-Tayeba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Thereafter, the MILF and ASG developed firm contact with Al Qaeda al Sulbah, which was quick in adopting regional Islamist jihad groups for carrying out holy war inside Afghanistan and for carrying out global attacks against the US and allied targets. The MILF had deputed a contingent of about 500 mujahideen to Pakistan via Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh in January 1984. There are reliable reports that the CIA cover flights had flown over 200 MILF mujahideen from Chittagong to Karachi in the garb of special flights for Haj pilgrims. After initial screening and training by the ISI, they were taken over by Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Salamat Hashim acted as the contact man in Pakistan. About 200 of these mujahideen were selected as fighting material. Saudi charities, ISI front organisations and Al Qaeda al Sulbah funded these ventures. At that point of time, the CIA paymaster in Pakistan made some funds available to Hashim.

However, Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the ISI developed different agendas in South East Asia as the Afghan war was being drawn to a victorious end. With the Afghan connection at his disposal, Osama bin Laden had started making long-term preparations for fighting the US interests in the Pacific Rim by stationing his brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa in the Philippines. This was simply not an intended war against the US interests. The Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the ISI had arrived at tacit understanding to transplant Afghan type jihad in South East Asia and create a distinct Islamic hub, as against increasing Christian influence. By 1989, the eastern fulcrum of evil had juxtaposed its operational objectives with the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and had started emerging as equal partners in jihad ventures in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Their objectives coincided in South East Asia also.

Khalifa had set up several front offices, trading units and charities. He was also in charge of the Saudi charity, Islamic International Relief Organisation. With the help of these tools, Jamal Khalifa had set up a terror network in the Philippines. Khalifa even funded Al Qaeda al Sulbah operatives in Jordan, Indonesia and Malaysia. Committed Al Qaeda al Sulbah stalwarts like Zubair, Abu Omar and Sadiq Odeh assisted him. Sadiq Odeh was linked to bombing in Kenya. Later senior Al Qaeda al Sulbah trainers were deputed to the Philippines who alongside a few Pakistani trainers (former ISI operatives) trained the MILF, Abu Sayyaf guerrillas, the Malayan Kamuplan Mujahideen, Jemmah Islamiyah and Lashkar Jandulla volunteers. The linkage is very deep and stretches to the core positions of Islamist terrorism in the entire South East Asia.

Of far more consequences was the connectivity between the Abu Sayyaf Group alias Al Harakat Al Islamiya, ISI floated Islamic tanzeems and Al- Qaeda. While in Khowst, on Pakistan Afghanistan border Janjalani had drifted closer to Ramzi Yousef. Ramzi had moved to the Philippines in 1994 after causing the February 1993 WTC bomb blast. Guided by Osama bin Laden and Khalifa he conceived of the grand plan to sabotage 11 US air flights over the Pacific– an operation named Oplan Bojinka. He recruited Abu Sayyaf jiahdis to carry out the plan. One of the suspects arrested for the WTC blast belonged to the ASG. In Bojinka plan an ISI-trained Pakistani Tareq Kaved Rana, a resident of Paranque, the Philippines, had played an important role. He had housed several of the conspirators at his place of stay, which was used for fabricating bombs. Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Ramzi Yousef and a Baloch Pakistani named Khalid Sheikh Mohammad guided the Manila cell of the Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Another Pakistan related terrorist was Wali Khan Shah, who had played a significant role in the Afghan jihad. He was entrusted by the ISI mentors to activate terrorist cells in Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. Another Pakistani born in Kuwait, Abdul Hakim Ali was trained by the ISI in bomb-making at Peshawar. He also teamed up with the Al Qaeda al Sulbah cell in the Philippines. Amein Mohammad, a product of Binori madrassa, Karachi, and another Pakistani owing allegiance to Harkat-ul-Ansar and trained by the ISI, also played vital roles in organising the Al Qaeda al Sulbah cells in Malaysia.

The plan that included assassination of the Pope was uncovered in time and a major disaster was averted. However, the leads revealed by spate of arrests and interrogations, indicated existence of another nascent plan to mount bigger attacks on the US target. These leads were neglected by the US security and intelligence agencies. They even did not suspect the ISI for its involvement with the Al Qaeda al Sulbah in planning out the sinister Philippines based operations.

Arrest of some Indonesian Jemmah Islamiyah terrorist suspects in March 2005 by Indonesian police in collaboration with Filipino security services unravelled the existence of fresh Abu Sayyaf training camps in Mindanao area, where about 35 JI terrorists were undergoing training under expert ASG and Al Qaeda al Sulbah trainers. These indicators tend to prove that Islamist jihad in the Philippines is far from over. It continues to be a part of the global design of the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and other jihadist tanzeems, which aspire to set up a vast Islamic hub comprising territories of Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Thailand, Southern Cambodia and the Philippines.

With the decline of the Abu Sayyaf group and an upper hand enjoyed by the Philippines’ security agencies over MILF operations, the insurgency situation has lost some sheen. Nevertheless, the Islamic International Jihad movement headed by the local insurgent groups, Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the ISI has the potential to escalate the level of violence once the present state of heightened security measures is relaxed, and the US diverts its attention from the Pacific Rim. Talks held in April 2005 between the Filipino government and the MILF representatives under the aegis of the Malaysian government have reportedly made satisfactory progress. The tripartite talks were resumed in June 2005. However, according to Filipino sources, the ASG is not amenable to the idea of a peace agreement between the MILF and Manila government, on terms of autonomy within the constitutional structure of the Philippines.

Indonesia witnessed growth of Islamic resurgence from early 1926, when Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was formed to revive Islam and to facilitate the growth of nationhood based on Islam. It drew inspiration from the Indian Muslim League and Deoband. While the Dutch imperialists endeavoured to suppress Islam as a fissiparous factor, the Japanese occupation forces required the Muslims in 1943 to promote hostility of the local populace against the Allied Powers. They had floated Masjumi, a political party of the Muslims. This did not flourish. The Islamic forces organised Darul Islam. It opposed the secular policies of Sukarno and it was suppressed by the state. The Islamic parties did not endorse Sukarno’s policy of Panchsheel and his closeness to the Communist Party (PKI).

These Islamic forces supported General Suharto in 1965 in his endeavour to overthrow Sukarno regime. However, Suharto too followed the secular traditions of his predecessor. In fact, he tried to defang the Islamic parties. This policy had prompted the Islamic parties to strengthen their forces at the social level and arouse demands for implementation of the Sharia as the state policy.

After 1980-82, Suharto had started losing grip on state power because of heavy corruption, nepotism and economic slowdown. Suharto adopted some cosmetic measures to implement Islamic rules and extending some fringe benefits to the Islamic army officials and bureaucrats. He had constructed out Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990. After disillusionment with the cosmetic measures of Suharto, the intellectuals joined forces with Wahid’s NU and Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDMI.

It may be relevant to note that the Islamist forces were not satisfied with the political moves made by Wahid and Megawati, who were in favour of promoting moderate Islamic rule. The hardcore Islamists had wanted implementation of pure Sharia rule. More than 30,000 Islamic academics were trained in the Middle Eastern and Pakistani institutions and madrassas. In Pakistan, madrassas at place like Binori, Muridke, Gujranwala, Attock and Peshawar etc churned out Islamic bigots, who emulated the tanzeems nurtured by the ISI. Some of them were trained in camp Musa, north of Peshawar by ISI officials along with Afghan and Pakistani mujahideen. They were exposed to Wahhabi tenets of Islam and also the practical aspects of jihad. A good number of them were thus in regular contact with some rabid Islamist mujahideen tanzeems, Al Qaeda al Sulbah and Taliban trainers and had developed fraternal links with them. They wanted immediate establishment of Deeni governance, based on Sharia and Hadith. The growth of Islamic terrorism and jihad in Indonesia was strengthened by failure of the illiberal democracy and its infiltration by the Islamists trained by Pakistan, Middle East and Al Qaeda al Sulbah. The detailed accounts of Islamist jihad in Indonesia and Malaysia will be clubbed together as the main jihadist body, the Jemmah Islamiyah had adversely affected both the countries. Some scholars have compared Jemmah Islamiyah as the mini Al Qaeda al Sulbah of South East Asia.

In Indonesia the central character is Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the JI chief. He was again detained on August 9th 2010 for sponsoring a terror training camp Aceh. He was first convicted under terror charges after Bali nightclub bombing in 2002 and sentenced for 18 months. Again he was sentenced for two years after bombing of Marriot hotel in Jakarta in 2003. Jemma Islamiyah’s role in South East Asia can be better understood from the following account related under the banner of Malaysia, though the Malaya peninsula is not as affected as Indonesia is.

Islam in Malaysia has been synonymous with tolerance. However, since 1970’s fundamentalist and jihadist Islam had started taking root in the Muslim-majority nation. The founding of United Malayas National Organisation (UMNO) by Onn bin Jaafar after the Second World War marked the resurgence of Malayan nationalism. Pro-Muslim factions did not endorse Jaafar’s secular approach and Tungku Abdul Rahman replaced him. UMNO’s policy of preference to the Bhumiputras (sons of the soil) and adoption of new economic policy had for a while satisfied the Muslims suspicious of economic and political preponderance of the Chinese and Indian population. The creation of Islamic Consultative Body (ICB) in 1981 had ensured that no government policy and development programme should violate the Islamic tenets. Mahathir’s adoption of Inclusion of Islamic Values Policy, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad and International Islamic University had titillated the Islamic aspirations of the Muslim population. Mahathir had tried to play safe to keep the Muslim clergy and population happy keeping eyes on their growing contact with the greater Islamic world and resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the region.

However, these measures did not satisfy the staunch Islamists. The fundamentalist groups saw UMNO as a party of the elite. These forces had formed the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) in 1951. PAS represented the Islamist strand of political consciousness, which succeeded in capturing power in some provinces. However, fundamentalism started growing rapidly because of widening economic disparity between the Chinese and the Malayans. These frustrations had received impetus from the institution of dakwahs, Islamic study groups like the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) founded by Anwar Ibrahim, the prominent political figure who was released from jail in end-2004. Despite mixed bag of measures of pacification of the Islamic aspirations of the people and political repression, the UMNO coalition came under heavy political pressure from PAS and demands for implementation of the Sharia and Fiq—Islamic jurisprudence—grew louder. In fact, the government had conceded to the popular demands and more than two-third of Malaysia’s 23 million Muslims are subject to Sharia rules. Aahukum Ahudud–Islamic criminal code– is however, being implemented in a moderate manner.

Though the UMNO continues to enjoy political preponderance with support from the Chinese and the Indian political parties, the PAS and the ulema have not given up on their demands for rapid Islamisation. Malaysia has been exposed to the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and its Southeast Asian tentacle Jemmah Islamiya. Under pressure, the UMNO has also adopted a policy of da’wa (mission) to islamise the government and the nation.

Having described in brief the trends of growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia and Malaysia, let us make an attempt to analyse the growth and spread of Islamic jihad in these countries.

Unlike the Muslim struggle for greater political rights in the Philippines, Indonesia’s tryst with Islamic terrorism started with the son of an East Java imam, Jafar Umar Thalib, who was trained in Al Maududi Institute of the Pakistan branch of the Jamait-e-Islami, Lahore. He was picked up by the ISI and was trained at a Peshawar camp. Later he joined the Afghan mujahideen under influence of a Yemeni mullah Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah. His camp was located near Peshawar border that was headed by an expert group of ISI commandos seconded to the Hizb-e-Islami faction of Hekmatyar. Later he met Osama at the latter’s camp at Peshawar. During his return journey two members of Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad accompanied him to Indonesia. They guided him in organising terrorist groups,. On return to Indonesia, Thalib organised Lashkar Jihad to fight the Christian groups of Mulukus, who demanded autonomy and independence. He sent about 3000 fighters to the Mulukus. A section of the Indonesian military connived with him.

Lashkar Jihad’s efforts to radicalise Islam in Indonesia and unfold the banner of jihad was complemented by organisations like Darul Islam, Islamic Youth Movement, the Defenders of Islam, Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World, Anti-Zionist Movement, Indonesian Muslim Students Action Front and Muhammadiya Students Association. The same group assisted by Jemmah Islamiyah and a faction of Indonesian army had carried out extreme atrocities on East Timor Christians. Volunteers from Pakistan and Bangladesh fortified the Lashkar Jihad contingents

The most important link between South East Asian Islamic jihad groups and the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah was forged by an umbrella organisation called Jemmah Islamiyah. Malaysia acted as a neutral ground for the Islamic jihadists of Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore and it was used as an important transit and launching station by the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah operatives. The most important Al Qaeda al Sulbah meeting in January 2000 that planned attack on USS Cole and the WTC attack on 9/11 was attended amongst others by Riduan Isamuddin Hambali, an important Al Qaeda leader in SE Asia, who was trained by the ISI and Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He was an important member of the Jemmah Islamiyah. Besides Riduan the meeting was also attended by ISI front operator Khalid Sheikh Mohammad.

Besides the Jemmah Islamiyah, Malaysia was presented by its own jihadist group–Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) – formed by some extremist factions of the Parti Islam seMalaysia (PAS). Formed in 1995 by Pakistan trained Afghan jihad veteran mujahideen Zainon Ismail, the KMM cadres were trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan. About 50 of his cadre were trained at Muridke camp of Lashkar-e-Tayeba. Later they were flown to Kuwait and by sea to Alor Satar in northwestern Malaysia. Zainon generally flew down to Kuwait and from there he visited Pakistan on the basis of Pakistani passport provided by Pakistani Mission in Kuwait. Zainon received liberal monetary help from the ISI. He was not alone. Nik Adi Nik Aziz, an Afghan war veteran, had linked up with the Abu Sayyaf Group, Indonesian radicals Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Abdullah Sungkar Riduan Isamuddin Hambali and Abu Jibril. This group worked under the umbrella of Jemmah Islamiyah.

Another associate group of Jemmah Islamiyah is Al Ma’unah Islamic. It grew out of Darul Islam movement and had some of its cadres trained in MILF camps and in madrassas near Lahore, where they were trained in guerrilla tactics by the trainers of Lashkar-e-Tayeba, at Shekhupura, Bedah and Qila Sattar Shah near Muridke, Pakistan.

Conceived way back in 1962 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’sayir, the Jemmah Islamiyah grew to be the most important Islamist hub in Indonesia and Malaysia with tentacles in Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia. Sungkar and Ba’asyir emerged as the most important Muslim leaders who supported the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and who had allowed their institutions to be used by Osama as hibernating and launching bases in South East Asia.

One of their disciples, Hambali, (since executed) was sponsored to visit Pakistan as a mujahid. After initial training in a Peshawar camp of the ISI and Markaz at Muridke, he was deputed to the training camp of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, leader of Ittihad-i-Islami in Afghanistan. There he was contacted by the Al Qaeda, which promised him of financial and logistical support. On return, he settled in Malaysia and carried out clandestine activities on behalf of the ISI and the Al Qaeda. Abu Jibril, another jihadist Indonesian, ably assisted him. The Jemmah Islamiyah drummed up the concept of Nausatara Raya, the Pan-Islamic Republic in South East Asia comprising the Philippines, Southern Thailand, Southern Cambodia and Singapore. Under ISI and Al Qaeda guidance and Jemmah Islamiyah support, two important Pakistanis—Wali Khan Amin Shah and Khalid Sheikh—and Hambali planned spectacular actions in SE Asia. Hambali started serious recruitment drive to form trained Al Qaeda cells all over the region. One of his important collaborators was Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra, who was trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan and was the mastermind behind Bali nightclub bombing in October 2002.

The involvement of Al Qaeda al Sulbah, Pakistani and Afghanistan volunteers in anti-Christian jihad in Mulukus, East Timor and Ambon firmly indicated the design of the Islamic International in the South East Asia region. The Al Qaeda had succeeded in establishing bases inside the Moro insurgent groups, Jemmah Islamiyah and Laskar Mujahideen forces. It is believed by western sources that Muhammad Atef, a 9/11 suspect, and al-Zawahiri, Osama’s number two, had visited Indonesia in June 2000 to survey the region. Between 2000 and 2001, the Jemmah Islamiyah was turned into a terrorist organisation under guidance of Ba’asyir, Hambali and Imam Samudra, etc. Their cells were responsible for several bombing incidents in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

These developments culminated in the Bali bombing. Of the thirty suspects arrested, the most important was Ali Gufron Mukhlas, an Indonesian associate of Ba’asyir and Hambali. His brothers Amrozi and Ali Imran were also arrested along with Imam Samudra. Imam Samudra was trained by the ISI and in camps in Afghanistan in 1992. While in Pakistan he was taken to the Binori madrassa, where bulk of the Taliban cadets were trained. ISI officials had introduced Samudra (neutralized) to operatives of Harkat-ul-Ansar and Markaz. He was also trained at the Muridke camp of the Markaz.

The most important accused in the case, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the spiritual and temporal leader of Jemmah Islamiyah, had inspired the conspirators of Bali bombing. According to Jakarta Post (04.03.2005) Indonesian Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, accused of leading an Al Qaeda al Sulbah-linked group blamed for bombings across SE Asia, was jailed for two-and-a-half years at the end of his terrorism trial. Ba’asyir was cleared of terrorism allegations but was jailed by a five-member panel of judges after being found guilty of involvement in a “sinister conspiracy” that led to the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed 202 people.
“The panel of judges decided that the defendant, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, has been legally and convincingly proven of engaging in a sinister conspiracy that led to fire and the death of others,” Chief Judge Sudarto said, as quoted by AFP.

A statement read out by one of the five judges said Ba’asyir had not been directly involved in carrying out the Bali blasts but had given his approval.

“The defendant knew that the perpetrators of the bombing were people who have been trained in bomb making in Pakistan and Afghanistan…the conditions of evil conspiracy have been met,” the statement said. The judges said that his words to key Bali bomber Amrozi and Hutomo Pamungkas, during a meeting in Solo, Central Java in 2002 had constituted the conspiracy. Ba’asyir had told them “I leave it up to you” when he was notified by Amrozi that he and his friends were planning “a program” in Bali. However, the USA and Australia have expressed dissatisfaction over the verdict. Majority of the tourists killed in Bali bombing were Australian nationals.

Violent bombings in Indonesia against Indonesian, American and Australian targets in 2003-2004 indicate that the activists of Jemmah Islamiyah are still active and there are clear evidences of their continued ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah linkages. They are avoiding visits to Pakistan to elude the US surveillance. However, Bangladesh contact points are being used liberally both for ideological support, training and fiscal incentives.

In Malaysia Islamic fanaticism has resurfaced with vengeance. They have meted out several threats to firebomb the Hindu temples in Penang and Batu (near Kualalumpur). At least three churches were firebombed after a court ruling that Christian churches can use the word Allah while referring to God. On August 9th two Malayan and a Indonesian were arrested for suspected Jemma Islamiyah link and for plotting terrorist activities. Such growing tendencies are causing strains in the composite Malaysian society.

Thailand is a predominantly Buddhist country. However, 5% Muslim population (3.2 million) lives in the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, Satun and Narathiwat. Thailand had a long history of confrontation with the Muslim-dominated states of Kedah, Pattani, Kelantan and Terengganu. About 2000 years ago Thailand occupied the present Muslim-dominated southern provinces. British colonisation of Malaya had finally settled the rush of conflicts between the southern Muslims and northern Buddhists. However, the present Muslim provinces were ruled by Malaya prathesaraj (pradesha raja–provincial governors) under strict control of the Thai king. The Thais had allowed the Muslim political and legal system to flourish. Majority of the Thai Muslims are Shia, though the Sunni factions have emerged stronger with Malayan, Arab, Pakistani and Bangladeshi support.

Muslims voiced demands for autonomy and independence between 1945 and 1976. Two Muslim separatist groups Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) and Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (BNPP) were most prominent in the southern provinces. The Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) encouraged them, but after its decline, the Muslim rebel forces in southern Thailand suffered several reverses. They, however, did not give up periodical confrontation. Thai Muslims were more exposed to the Wahhabi form of Sunni Islam compared to assimilistic Islam in other provinces of Malaysia. Several madrassas have been built in the southern provinces with financial help from Libya, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Ismail Mufti, the rector of Yala Islamic College, is a firebrand Wahhabist. He has gathered around him a large firebrand Islamist group. On the other hand, ulemas from Pakistan and Bangladesh visit the southern provinces regularly. Several Indian preachers belonging to Ahl-e-Hadith and Tabligh-i-Jammat had also impacted the Thai Muslims. Saudi NGOs and Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad of Pakistan fund them. In recent times, the HUJI of Bangladesh has also marked its presence by deputing nearly a dozen alems to teach Islam in the interior madrassas.

In Thailand’s Islamic insurgency, the following combatant groups are involved:

• United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bertasu)
• Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP)
• Barisan Nasional Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP-1963)
• Barasi Revolusi Nasional (BRN-1960)
• Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP)-established by Afghan veterans with connectivities to the Kampulan Mujahideen Malaya (KMM)
• Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (PIMM)
• Mujahideen Islamic Pattani Group and
• Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO-established 1965). The New PULO emerged as a breakaway group in 1995.

Thai Muslims are mostly of Malayan origin with liberal admixture of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi genealogical streams that occurred in the course of trading, intermarriage and religious educational exchanges.

Gradually, the old social and cultural practices were eroded after the Arab world and Pakistan started paying attention to this pocket of conflict in Thailand. In the mid-1980s, the country had more than 2,000 mosques in 38 Thai provinces, with the largest number (434) in Narathiwat Province. All but a very small number of the mosques were associated with the Sunni branch of Islam; the remainder was of the Shia branch. Thai Muslims are either hereditary Muslims, Muslims by intermarriage, or recent converts; Cham Muslims originally from Cambodia; West Asians include both Sunni and Shias; South Asians, including Tamils, Punjabis and Bengalis; Indonesians, especially Javanese and Minangkabau. This diversity had caused delay in the spread of Wahhabism and militancy. However, a number of Islamist preachers from Pakistan, Saudi, Yemen and Bangladesh visited the tract regularly between 1980 and 2000. These preachers were responsible for strengthening the Wahhabi stream of Islam through teachings in madrassas and sermons in the mosques. They also discouraged the Thai Muslims from performing traditional Hindu art forms very popular in Malaysia and Indonesia. Thai social practices were also discouraged as being jahiliya.
According to Thai authorities over 5000 students had studied in Indonesian and Malaysian madrassas, 500 in Saudi Arabia and over three thousand in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Southern Thailand’s terrorist incidents between 2000 and 2009 raised the question of Al Qaeda al Sulbah, ISI and Bangladeshi mujahideen tanzeem’s involvement. The Muslim strike groups were fashioned in Al Qaeda manner with small cells of 30/40 functioning independently. Inputs also came from Jemmah Islamiyah of Indonesia, which tried to bomb foreign embassies in Bangkok. In this connection Arfin bin Ali, a Singaporean trained in Pakistan, was arrested. Similarly Kampulan Mujahideen of Malaysia and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) also supported the Thai Muslims.

Many Muslim Thai activists went overseas to Islamic schools, where they came under influence of hard-line teachers. About 3350 of them were trained in Pakistani madrassas in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar. About 125 of these were trained in armed combat in ISI-managed facilities near Quetta. Some were reported to have joined the jihad war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and returned to Thailand as extremists. They in turn exhorted the Thai Muslims to adopt Sharia and practise Islamic Fiq—jurisprudence. Between 1980 and 2000, these rabid Pakistan trained elements had succeeded in establishing over 200 madrassas in the three southern provinces. Bangladesh also helped the Thai Muslims in developing firm Islamic roots. The Jamait-e-Islami Bangladesh, Tabligh-i-Jammat Bangladesh and HUJI sent volunteers to convert the Thai Muslims to hardcore Wahhabists. Along with Islamic knowledge, came financial help and arms training. Thailand is a unique ground where the ISI talents freely collaborated with Bangladeshi jihadists.

During 2000, Thai authorities responded with military force and legal action against separatist activity in the south. In February, security forces dealt a severe blow to the New Pattani United Liberation Organization — a Muslim separatist group — when they killed its leader Sari Taloh-Meyaw. Authorities claim that he was responsible for 90 percent of the terrorist activities in Narathiwat, a southern Thai province. In April 2004, police arrested the deputy leader of the outlawed Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) — a southern separatist group — in Pattani. Authorities suspected Muslim separatists conducted several small-scale attacks on public schools, a government-run clinic, and a police station in the south. In recent times, the Muslim jihadis have started confronting the Buddhist institutions and individuals with a view to fomenting communal clashes. Several schools were destroyed, Buddhist monks were killed and even military and police personnel were assassinated. Thai military, however, reacted brutally, killing hundreds.

There are reliable reports about ingestion of ISI and DGFI trained jihadist trainers to southern Thailand. According to Aurel Croissant of Contemporary Conflict (Strategic Insight, Vol IV, Issue 2-February 2005)…. “Purist salafi (more specifically Wahhabi) has been gaining ground—propelled by donations from charities and benefactors in the Middle East….Funded by private donations and in many cases founded by teachers (ustaz), who themselves have done religious studies in Pakistan and Middle East, some ponoh (madrassa) became breeding grounds for potential radical Muslims.” This view has been supported by Thai government who claim that over 5000 Thai Muslims graduated from Pakistani tanzeems.

The trouble is far from over. Between end-2004 and July 2009, over 340 violent incidents have been reported in which the Muslim jihadists had burnt down schools, assassinated Buddhist monks and even ambushed Thai army personnel. Massive efforts by the government in Bangkok to adopt the carrot and stick policy have not produced the desired results. The Thai authorities are painfully aware of liberal assistance to the southern Muslims by the Jemmah Islamiyah, ISI supported Pakistani forces and Islamist forces from Bangladesh.

For the purpose of coordinating the activities of the Muslim jihadist groups in Southeast Asia, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir had set up Rabitatul Mujahidin. He had deployed JI activists like Tamsil Linrung, Agus Dwikarna, Al-Chaidar, Omar al-Faruq etc. to Thailand, Myanmar and Bangladesh. According to western sources, ISI stations in Bangkok—Phuket and Pattaya—have coordinated the activities of JI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah operatives in Thailand.

Osama bin Laden’s scheme to blow up the Israeli embassy in Bangkok was detected by chance. Ramzi Yousef had transited through Thailand after the 9/11 attacks on the USA. The Wae Ka Raeh (WKR) and Gurgan Mujahidin Islam Pattani etc. jihadist organisations are known to have direct links to the JI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah. The WKR is known to be a mafia gang indulging in drug peddling, kidnapping and other underworld activities. Seven of its volunteers were trained in ISI camp in Peshawar and later they fought in Afghanistan jihad. In May 2003, one Thai national, a member of the Om Al Quran Foundation, an Al Qaeda al Sulbah front, was arrested in Cambodia. Besides this, about 20 Thai Muslim jihadists were trained at the Ukhia camp in Bangladesh by the HUJI, an organisation known to have confirmed links to Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the ISI.

ISI complicity with some of the Thai Muslim extremists has been formally established by the presence of about 12 WKR and Gurgan Mujahidin Islam Pattani volunteers in a training camp managed jointly by the ISI and DGFI near Bandarban, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (2002). Though poorly armed, it is believed that Myanmar Muslim rebels are gradually supplying sophisticated arms to the Thai jihadists through this route.

Recent attacks on Buddhist monks, Thai government officials, and railway trains etc. indicate that the Islamists are heading towards ‘communalisation’ of the political and economic problems in the Muslim- dominated provinces of Thailand. With known and identified links with the ISI sponsored Pakistani Islamist tanzeems, the Al Qaeda al Sulbah, Jemmah Islamiyah, Jamait-e-Islami and HUJI openly supporting the Muslim separatists it is expected that the Buddhist regime in Bangkok has to settle down for a longer struggle against the Islamist jihadists. Next to the Philippines, Thailand is on the anvil of emerging as a prominent theatre of Islamist jihad.

The Islamic separatists talk about establishment of a Pan-Islamic hub—Nausatara Raya—in South East Asia. It also includes southern Cambodia, home of the Cham Muslims. The Chams are descendants of the mixed Malaya-Polynesian-Chinese-Indian stock and they once ruled over a vast territory called Champa. Hindu religion and culture prevailed in this area, which was later replaced by Buddhism and much later, partly by Islam. The Muslim Chams of southern Cambodia have a history of resisting the Lon Nol and Pol Pot regimes. ‘Fulro Champa’, a resistant group, was organised by Le Kasim, a colonel in Lon Nol regime. Pol Pot had exterminated over 5 lakh Muslims.

Islamic fervour has also influenced the tiny Muslim population in southern Cambodia. Under the Khmer Rouge, the Cham Muslims were the most persecuted community. This population has started regenerating itself with liberal aid from the Wahhabi institutions in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. More than 150 mosques and 35 madrassas have been constructed and ulemas from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia visit these institutions to impart training in Islamic studies. About 100 students are deputed each year for religious studies in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. A large number of students are also sponsored by Islamic charities for studying in Malaysia. The Cham Muslim area of Cambodia is shown as a part of the greater unified Islamic nation comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand and southern Philippines.

Arab, Pakistani and Malayan NGOs pump in over $20 million a year for construction of mosques, madrassas and common civil facilities. The main aid-receiving agency is Samakum Islam Kampuchea. The Islamic Development Banks of Jeddah, Dubai Arabs like Ishaq bin Nasir and Muhammad Qasim pour financial help to the Cham Muslims for opening madrassas and constructing new mosques. Dakwa Tabligh is a new development in Cham area. It was imported from Malaysia, but was strengthened by Pakistan and Malayan preachers and South Asian Tabligh-i-Jamaat bodies. They preached the practice of Shariat and Hadith. In this venture, branches of the Ahl-e-Hadith from Pakistan and Bangladesh have also established roots in Cham area.

Despite secular pretensions of Malaysia and Indonesia the Islamists are trying to emerge as reckonable political forces right from Rohingya area of Myanmar to Cham area in Cambodia. To some people like Abau Bakar Ba’asyir Nausetara Raya is not a distant dream. A united Muslim political entity in South East Asia is achievable. These thoughts are also believed in Islamabad, Riyadh, Kuwait, Cairo and Tripoli etc capitals.

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Image: Spanish MoD

The objective of the Programme for Peace and Reintegration, driven by the Afghan Government and supported by ISAF, is to facilitate the reintegration of those members of the insurgency who renounce violence and commit to uphold Afghan law.

“After the death in May of Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, who essentially served as al-Qai’da’s chief financial officer, we will continue to work with our allies to target those like al-Khayr who could step into al-Yazid’s shoes,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. “Today’s designation of al-Khayr by the United States and the United Nations will help to ensure that that al-Qai’da remains in severe financial straits.”

Al-Khayr is listed among 85 persons wanted by the government of Saudi Arabia, in part because of his role as an al-Qai’da financial facilitator. The list was circulated in 2009. He has transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars for a specific terrorist attack against U.S. interests. Al-Khayr also acts for al-Qai’da in a leadership role on the media committee, and has on at least one occasion recruited a member for al-Qai’da. His relationship with al-Qai’da began with military training the terrorist group provided him in the mid-1990s. Al-Khayr is a son-in-law of Osama bin Laden and has also provided services to bin Laden as a bodyguard.

As per Amr Hamzawy, these repressive governments survive using five ways. This includes pouring money into security to intimidate or even kill the citizens; use of religious institutions and the media; respond with iron fist; ideological and religious agenda’s; and close alliances based on their common interests are leading these regimes.

Some ruling elites in Arab world want to promote ideas like rationality, negotiation, and peaceful settlements, others align themselves with non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Although the regimes lose their legitimacy amid deteriorating social conditions, they will remain secure.

Amr Hamzawy recommends that The West needs to act in defense of democracy in the Arab world. It’s critical for its interests in the Middle East peace process, Iraq, Egypt, and Yemen as democracy is the only sustained path for development, moderation, and peace.