“Throughout the mission, the IRRS team received full cooperation from SSM staff in its review of Sweden’s regulatory, technical and policy issues,” said Georg Schwarz, mission leader and Deputy Director General of the Swiss nuclear regulator (ENSI).

SSM operates as an independent regulator in an open and transparent manner with well-organized regulatory processes. Following the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident, SSM ordered the review. The mission took place from 6 to 17 February 2012 at the SSM’s headquarters in Stockholm. Sweden has signed and ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the OSPAR, HELCOM and Espoo Conventions and other relevant conventions in the area of nuclear safety and radiation protection. SSM has signed bilateral co-operation and information exchange agreements with several countries and participates actively at various levels in the international arena.

Sweden has 10 nuclear power reactors in three nuclear power plants (Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals), three units in permanent shutdown and a fuel fabrication facility. As of 2010, nuclear contributed 38.13 per cent to the country’s electricity production.

The country has a central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel and a centre for waste treatment, storage and material investigation. Sweden has also identified a location (Forsmark) as final repository for radioactive waste.

This brings Iran much closer to accumulating a stockpile of uranium useable in nuclear weapons. The 20 percent fuel loaded into the Tehran reactor in the presence of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad today only just falls short of the “highly enriched” designation banned under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and highlights the progress Iran has made toward production of 90 percent-plus weapons-grade fuel.

Tehran had announced plans to enrich to 20 percent as long ago as 2009, when it failed to secure another supply of fuel rods from overseas.

Experts say that longstanding pattern of rhetoric emanating from Tehran is designed to convince the international community that it is unable to stop Iran’s quest to become a nuclear power. Despite the reality of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the deliberately orchestrated pomp surrounding today’s announcement, Iran is facing real difficulties thanks to the growing strength of the international sanctions regime.

Given the increasing evidence of the economic impact of sanctions targeting the country’s oil exports, HJS Non-Resident Associate Fellow Sohrab Ahmari said “The Iranian regime is on the retreat on numerous fronts. Tehran’s sense of frustration is apparent in its increasingly shrill rhetoric and desperate assassination attempts in Georgia, India, and Thailand. But this is no time for a respite in the West. The international community must now ensure that the sanctions regime is enforced vigorously and uniformly, that all loopholes are closed, and that major Asian consumers in world oil and gas markets – including the likes of India, Malaysia, Japan, and South Korea – are brought on board.”

In June 2011, ATMEA had announced the review by ASN. The review conducted was concluded on Nov 2011 with the French institute for radiological protection and nuclear safety (IRSN). ASN confirmed that the reactor’s safety objectives and options are consistent with French regulations, as is the consideration given to internal and external hazards. In addition, ATMEA’s assessment of the Fukushima accident, demonstrating that the ATMEA1 reactor’s safety options are such that no design changes are needed at this time, was favorably received by ASN.

“The ATMEA1 reactor meets the international safety criteria for Generation III+ reactors. The ASN finding constitutes an important milestone for the construction of the ATMEA1 reactor in France and in other countries in the world” said Philippe Namy, President of ATMEA.

The French nuclear safety authority (ASN), an independent authority created by the law of June 2006 on transparency and safety in the nuclear field, provides regulatory oversight for all civilian nuclear activities in France.

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) conducting a Pre-Project Design Review of ATMEA1 reactor technology in Canada.

The reactor conceptual design has been already successfully reviewed by IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) against its safety standards.

The storage facility is one among the measures for addressing the aftermath of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Processing of water containing radioactive substances accumulated within the station’s Unit 1 to 4 buildings is a critical issue and currently the reactors are being cooled by circulating water that is treated by radioactive substance removal and desalination processes. The storage facility to be constructed will stably store radioactive sludge, of slurry consistency, generated during coagulated settling within the decontamination apparatus in the radioactive substance removal process.

Image: MHI

The company has already delivered storage tanks for highly radiated waste liquid to the Tokai and Rokkasho reprocessing plants (respectively in Ibaraki and Aomori prefectures). For the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the company is involved in conversion of a “Mega-Float” for pooling of moderately radiated accumulated water and has provided forklift truck-based special vehicles equipped with a radiation-shielded cabin to handle rubble in the accident site.

On March 9, US pressed charges against a Pakistani man Nadeem Akhtar, 45, living in Maryland for illegally buying goods with nuclear dual-use applications between 2005 and 2010 and sending them to the Pakistani nuclear program. The indictment, among the nuclear dual-use goods allegedly sent to Pakistan by Akhtar were calibration and switching equipment, resins for coolant water purification, surface refinishing abrasives, and radiation detection devices. The recipients of the illicit procurement operation were the Chashma nuclear power plant (CNPP) and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO).

Akhtar allegedly had associates in Dubai (Bosfor General Trading and Shairook Scrap USP LLC) and Pakistan for shipments. US has not provided the name of a Pakistan based man who has been also indicted. Since Pakistan refuses to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), US doesn’t allows export of U.S. goods with nuclear applications to Pakistan, specifically to entities such as SUPARCO and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Some of the entities administered by them are Chashma nuclear power plant and the Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (PIEAS). These administered entities conduct nuclear research and development and operates a research reactor in Pakistan. Akhtar’s illicit export to Chashma included equipments used for controlling electrical circuits and lighting in nuclear power and fuel reprocessing plants.

The illict exports included 3M abrasive sheets, which are controlled by US for their dual-use applications in refinishing valve surfaces and other equipment which requires high tolerances.

On 2 March 2010, Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission had ascertained the effectiveness of Iran´s safety regulation of Bushehr nuclear power plant (BNPP-1) and to identify possible improvements before the plant begins operation.

On Thursday, 19 August, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority replied that “All the nuclear installations in Pakistan such as the nuclear power plants and research reactors are located at sites which have not been affected by floods. Moreover, all radioactive sources in the flood affected areas have been verified to be safe and secure”.

Among the key findings Ashley writes that”Unlike the secret Sino–Pakistani agreement, the U.S.-India deal was publicly debated in both countries. When China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, it agreed not to sell nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon states that do not accept full-scope safeguards. A sale to Pakistan violates those terms. While the United States requested a special waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group to sell nuclear material to India, China has given no indication that it has such plans for Pakistan.”

Asley argues that Washington has successfully pressured Beijing—both multilaterally and bilaterally—to halt nuclear sales to Pakistan, in the past. He writes “The record of the last decade suggests that the United States has been successful in impeding problematic Chinese nuclear sales to Pakistan whenever it has remonstrated with Beijing at very high levels of government in both capitals,” Tellis writes. “There is no reason why President Obama cannot sustain this record of American achievement if he invests time and attention on this issue, given the emphasis he has placed on managing nuclear proliferation.”

“The integrity of the global nonproliferation system requires an orderly and coordinated process for managing change—which the NSG provides—and China, as a member of that group, should be permitted to consummate its prospective deal with Pakistan only if it first secures an NSG exemption from the current guidelines,” he adds.

They say that some U.S. allies also break U.S. or foreign trade control laws to outfit their missile or nuclear weapons programs. BIS did not identify the suspected purchasers of these goods in Israel or India.

Between 2003 and 2007, Telogy LLC and Telogy Intl allegedly cooperated to attempt to export oscilloscopes to India and Israel. Telogy LLC and Telogy Intl allegedly cooperated to export a spectrum analyzer, monitoring equipment controlled for national security reasons, to China. Telogy Intl is also charged with allegedly re-exporting a spectrum analyzer to South Africa. The companies have neither admitted nor denied these allegations.

“President Obama and his national security team have had unprecedented success in building an international coalition to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. I share the President’s sense of urgency about this critical issue, and I strongly commend his decision to sign into law our Iran sanctions bill. Congress and this Administration are partners in this effort, and we will continue to work together to pursue our goal of a peaceful and stable region in the Middle East.

“I supported the President’s efforts to engage Iran diplomatically. But now we must focus on the pressure track, and we hope this legislation – taken together with action by the United Nations and our allies – will provide the President with the tools he needs to persuade Tehran to permanently abandon its nuclear weapons program.

“In the fall I intend to hold a hearing to review the effectiveness of our efforts to achieve this goal.”