In June 2011, ATMEA had announced the review by ASN. The review conducted was concluded on Nov 2011 with the French institute for radiological protection and nuclear safety (IRSN). ASN confirmed that the reactor’s safety objectives and options are consistent with French regulations, as is the consideration given to internal and external hazards. In addition, ATMEA’s assessment of the Fukushima accident, demonstrating that the ATMEA1 reactor’s safety options are such that no design changes are needed at this time, was favorably received by ASN.

“The ATMEA1 reactor meets the international safety criteria for Generation III+ reactors. The ASN finding constitutes an important milestone for the construction of the ATMEA1 reactor in France and in other countries in the world” said Philippe Namy, President of ATMEA.

The French nuclear safety authority (ASN), an independent authority created by the law of June 2006 on transparency and safety in the nuclear field, provides regulatory oversight for all civilian nuclear activities in France.

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) conducting a Pre-Project Design Review of ATMEA1 reactor technology in Canada.

The reactor conceptual design has been already successfully reviewed by IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) against its safety standards.

The storage facility is one among the measures for addressing the aftermath of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Processing of water containing radioactive substances accumulated within the station’s Unit 1 to 4 buildings is a critical issue and currently the reactors are being cooled by circulating water that is treated by radioactive substance removal and desalination processes. The storage facility to be constructed will stably store radioactive sludge, of slurry consistency, generated during coagulated settling within the decontamination apparatus in the radioactive substance removal process.

Image: MHI

The company has already delivered storage tanks for highly radiated waste liquid to the Tokai and Rokkasho reprocessing plants (respectively in Ibaraki and Aomori prefectures). For the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the company is involved in conversion of a “Mega-Float” for pooling of moderately radiated accumulated water and has provided forklift truck-based special vehicles equipped with a radiation-shielded cabin to handle rubble in the accident site.

On March 9, US pressed charges against a Pakistani man Nadeem Akhtar, 45, living in Maryland for illegally buying goods with nuclear dual-use applications between 2005 and 2010 and sending them to the Pakistani nuclear program. The indictment, among the nuclear dual-use goods allegedly sent to Pakistan by Akhtar were calibration and switching equipment, resins for coolant water purification, surface refinishing abrasives, and radiation detection devices. The recipients of the illicit procurement operation were the Chashma nuclear power plant (CNPP) and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO).

Akhtar allegedly had associates in Dubai (Bosfor General Trading and Shairook Scrap USP LLC) and Pakistan for shipments. US has not provided the name of a Pakistan based man who has been also indicted. Since Pakistan refuses to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), US doesn’t allows export of U.S. goods with nuclear applications to Pakistan, specifically to entities such as SUPARCO and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Some of the entities administered by them are Chashma nuclear power plant and the Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (PIEAS). These administered entities conduct nuclear research and development and operates a research reactor in Pakistan. Akhtar’s illicit export to Chashma included equipments used for controlling electrical circuits and lighting in nuclear power and fuel reprocessing plants.

The illict exports included 3M abrasive sheets, which are controlled by US for their dual-use applications in refinishing valve surfaces and other equipment which requires high tolerances.

On 2 March 2010, Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission had ascertained the effectiveness of Iran´s safety regulation of Bushehr nuclear power plant (BNPP-1) and to identify possible improvements before the plant begins operation.

On Thursday, 19 August, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority replied that “All the nuclear installations in Pakistan such as the nuclear power plants and research reactors are located at sites which have not been affected by floods. Moreover, all radioactive sources in the flood affected areas have been verified to be safe and secure”.

Among the key findings Ashley writes that”Unlike the secret Sino–Pakistani agreement, the U.S.-India deal was publicly debated in both countries. When China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, it agreed not to sell nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon states that do not accept full-scope safeguards. A sale to Pakistan violates those terms. While the United States requested a special waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group to sell nuclear material to India, China has given no indication that it has such plans for Pakistan.”

Asley argues that Washington has successfully pressured Beijing—both multilaterally and bilaterally—to halt nuclear sales to Pakistan, in the past. He writes “The record of the last decade suggests that the United States has been successful in impeding problematic Chinese nuclear sales to Pakistan whenever it has remonstrated with Beijing at very high levels of government in both capitals,” Tellis writes. “There is no reason why President Obama cannot sustain this record of American achievement if he invests time and attention on this issue, given the emphasis he has placed on managing nuclear proliferation.”

“The integrity of the global nonproliferation system requires an orderly and coordinated process for managing change—which the NSG provides—and China, as a member of that group, should be permitted to consummate its prospective deal with Pakistan only if it first secures an NSG exemption from the current guidelines,” he adds.

They say that some U.S. allies also break U.S. or foreign trade control laws to outfit their missile or nuclear weapons programs. BIS did not identify the suspected purchasers of these goods in Israel or India.

Between 2003 and 2007, Telogy LLC and Telogy Intl allegedly cooperated to attempt to export oscilloscopes to India and Israel. Telogy LLC and Telogy Intl allegedly cooperated to export a spectrum analyzer, monitoring equipment controlled for national security reasons, to China. Telogy Intl is also charged with allegedly re-exporting a spectrum analyzer to South Africa. The companies have neither admitted nor denied these allegations.

“President Obama and his national security team have had unprecedented success in building an international coalition to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. I share the President’s sense of urgency about this critical issue, and I strongly commend his decision to sign into law our Iran sanctions bill. Congress and this Administration are partners in this effort, and we will continue to work together to pursue our goal of a peaceful and stable region in the Middle East.

“I supported the President’s efforts to engage Iran diplomatically. But now we must focus on the pressure track, and we hope this legislation – taken together with action by the United Nations and our allies – will provide the President with the tools he needs to persuade Tehran to permanently abandon its nuclear weapons program.

“In the fall I intend to hold a hearing to review the effectiveness of our efforts to achieve this goal.”

Based on procurement data and public advertisements for bidding requests, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) concluded in 2006 that India was on the verge of adding at least 3,000 centrifuges to the RMP1. If the construction seen in the March 3, 2010 imagery is for a new gas centrifuge hall, India’s uranium enrichment capacity at RMP will be greatly expanded.

Figure 1. Click to Expand

Since the 1970s, India has pursued gas centrifuges to enrich uranium. The history and current status of India’s gas centrifuge program has been a long-held state secret. ISIS has been producing reports that trace the history of India’s centrifuge enrichment program and assess its current and projected enrichment capacity based on open sources, information from interviews with Indian and other government officials, and publicly available procurement data.

The Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) commissioned India’s main enrichment plant, codenamed the Rare Materials Project (RMP), around 1990. In addition to a gas centrifuge facility, this site, located about 19 kilometers from Mysore, may also contain a uranium hexafluoride production facility. As per ISIS, by 1997, after several years of difficulty, India seems to have achieved a technical breakthrough at RMP. Although India has experienced difficulties in building centrifuges, it now appears to be competent at constructing centrifuges comparable to those common in Europe in the 1970s. ISIS concluded in 2007 that, India is currently operating between 2,000 and 3,000 centrifuges at the RMP. The DAE in 2007 was attempting to expand the number of centrifuges at RMP by 3,000, increasing RMP’s capacity by at least 15,000 separative work units (SWU) per year, a common measure of the output of a uranium enrichment plant and more than double its current output.

The Indian government designated its gas centrifuge enrichment facilities, such as RMP, as military sites under the framework of US-India nuclear cooperation. Thus, India is unlikely to use these facilities to create fuel for the Tarapur boiling water reactors, which will be designated as civilian facilities. India is currently importing sufficient amounts of low enriched uranium (LEU) to fuel the Tarapur reactors. These reactors could have otherwise absorbed the RMP’s capacity.

As a result of its recently acquired ability to import LEU, India can devote the enrichment capacity of RMP to highly enriched uranium (HEU) for military applications. As per ISIS in 2007, India would most likely use the HEU for fuel in submarine reactors and in thermonuclear weapons. The production of thermonuclear weapons may lead India to conduct additional underground nuclear tests as it seeks to make more deliverable, reliable, and efficient weapons.

The statement says that the real problem with weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East does not relate to Israel but to those countries that have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and brazenly violated it – Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Libya, Syria and Iran. That is why the resolution adopted by the NPT Review Conference not only fails to advance regional security but actually sets it back.

As a non-signatory state of the NPT, Israel says that is not obligated by the decisions of this Conference, which has no authority over Israel. Given the distorted nature of this resolution, Israel will not be able to take part in its implementation.

Regarding the practical consequences of this resolution for Israel, Israel says that it has taken note of the important clarifications that have been made by the United States regarding its policy. Israeli Prime Minister will discuss this issue with President Obama on his upcoming visit to Washington this Tuesday.