To understand the evolution of the Indian Intelligence Bureau, the oldest surviving intelligence agency of the world, it is necessary to peep into the process of evolution it passed through.

The Imperial British government felt the need for organising a strong military and civil intelligence outfit soon after its victory over the rebellious Indian forces in 1857. The victory had reposed multifaceted responsibility on the burgeoning British Crown and its ever-expanding empire in India. It had to effectively suppress the Muslim and Hindu rulers to consolidate and expand its territories; ensure law and order in the directly controlled and administered territories; maintain vigil on the territories ruled by native princes and to gather intelligence about friendly and hostile preparations of regimes in China, Afghanistan and the expanding empire of Russia. Defeat of the Mughal power had also brought about cascading political turmoil in other parts of the Muslim world in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia.

There is a popular belief amongst the intelligence community that the Intelligence Bureau was conceived and set up as the “Central Special Branch’ by an order of the Secretary of State for India in London, on December 23, 1887.

Some authors surmised that the first intelligence outfit in India was started in 1885 when Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor was appointed Quartermaster General and head of the Intelligence Department of the Indian Army.

It was yet claimed that the Intelligence Bureau should trace its origins to the ‘Anti-Thuggee and Dacoity Department’ since its inception in 1835. This claim made by certain quarters in the intelligence fraternity is also not accurate.

The British Thuggee concerns dated back to 1828, due largely to the efforts of Lord William Bentinck, Governor General of India, who had started an extensive campaign involving profiling, intelligence gathering, and executions of the Thuggee groups. The campaign was heavily based on informants recruited from captured thugs who were offered protection on the condition that they told everything they knew. By the 1870′s, the Thuggee cult was extinct, but the concept of ‘criminal tribes’ and ‘criminal castes’ is still in the mindset of India.

A police organisation known as the ‘Thuggee and Dacoity Department’ was established within the Government of India, with Colonel William Sleeman as superintendent of the department in 1835. The Department remained in existence until 1904 when it was replaced by the Central Criminal Intelligence Department. It would, therefore, be seen that the Intelligence Bureau had only partially inherited its origins to the Thuggee and Dacoity Department and to the ‘Central Specail Branch’ established in London in December 1887. The MI unit started in 1885 had evolved into a separate Military Intelligence outfit.

While on the question of the Thuggees it should be stated that even Ziauddin Barni’s History of Firoz Shah (written about 1356) had mentioned about the Thuggee problem and creation of a special force in Delhi that had rounded up over 200 Thuggeees and were banished to the political kalapani of Lakhnauti (Laxmanabati-Gaur) in modern Bengal. The Emperor had not christened his special force as a Thuggee Department, nonetheless, he used more or less the same tactics as the British did centuries later.

In fact, very minor strand of Indian Intelligence fraternity was born in the womb of the Thuggee Department. It was given criminal investigation, military utility and political mandates from day one, soon after the the British Crown set to the mission of consolidating and expamnding ite Empire in India and territories around the first Colony in world history that showered manna on the entire western world. Intelligence was one of the arms used by the British to run their writs in India and other parts of global colonies. In this venture Indian intelligence and army helped the British more than the original sons of the Albion.

The need for the creation of this Central Special Branch was realised for procuring early and authentic information by the Central Government regarding the political, economic and social conditions of the people in British India. It was also to monitor the growth and development of popular feeling on issues concerned with security and keeping a watchful control over the inter-provincial activities and movements of criminals and the conditions that predisposed to crime. The tasks assigned to the Central Special Branch were to coordinate the working of the Special Branches of the provincial governments in British India, created under the same order of the Secretary of State, and to guide the new units set up directly under its own charge in the various princely states.

The new organisation started functioning as a wing of ‘Anti-Thuggi and Dacoity Department’, which had attained notable success and renown since its inception in 1835 as an all India outfit to contain the incipient terrorism of that period and subsequently took over its infrastructure. Since then, the nomenclature of the organisation underwent several changes.

As a result of the recommendation of the Police Commission of 1902-03, the Central Special Branch was remodeled and rechristened as the ‘Central Criminal Intelligence Department’, which was made responsible for all matters pertaining to national security in addition to its role in prevention of inter-provincial crime, and was designated as the nodal agency of the Government of India.

The word ‘Criminal’ was dropped from the name of the organisation by 1918 as its burgeoning security tasks started to far overshadow its criminal responsibilities. The present name, the Intelligence Bureau, came to be adopted by the organisation in the year 1920.

With the advent of the provincial governments run by Indian politicians in 1935, the Government of India decided that the Intelligence Bureau should have its own apparatus and arrangements for the collection of strategic intelligence in the provinces, to augment the information supplied by the Provincial CIDs and Special Branches.

Field units of the IB were thus organised in 1935, initially at six centres in the country, each under a Central Intelligence Officer, and subsequently elsewhere. The growth of national security problems and their increasing complexities led to the concept of setting up of Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau in the field, under the charge of Deputy Directors, in the fifties, to organise more scientific and systematic intelligence gathering.

The analytical and directional setup at the Bureau’s headquarters at Delhi also gradually grew, with newer and newer challenges and sources of threat to national security being identified over the years.

From its inception in the year 1887, the organisation has constantly striven to pursue the goal of maintaining the unity and integrity of the country thwart the machinations of subversive elements, and defeat the forces of disruption and de-stabilisation. In the years prior to Independence, a good deal of the IB’s effort was devoted to tackling problems of securing the boundaries of the country, preserving the basic essential services against disruption, and dealing with sustained militancy of organised groups. It was in this period that much of the formal shape was given to law enforcement on a countrywide scale and the IB played a significant role throughout this process.

As the specter of Communism began to haunt Europe and other parts of the world after 1921, the attention of the Intelligence Bureau was also diverted to meeting this imminent threat to the reigning forces in the country. Utilisation of the professional operators and agents of the IB against USSR designs in the Central Asian Countries and Afghanistan would require a separate volume to account for.

It was after 1947 that the IB really came into its own as the intelligence arm of new India. It had inherited the imperial traditions and expected to imbibe the democratic aspirations of modern India.

Half of the bifurcated IB went to Pakistan as Pakistan IB with Mohammad Ali as the chief.

The Indian part of the Intelligence Bureau was taken over by T.G. Sanjeevi Pillai. Besides the inherent strength of the organisation, the calibers of its first two Directors in the post Independence period-Shri Pillai and his successor, the legendary ‘Father of Intelligence’ in modem India; Shri B. N. Mullik- largely enabled the IB to measure up to these new and unprecedented challenges. Between them these two pioneers laid the foundations of a vibrant intelligence organisation giving a new dimension and dynamism to the newer thrust areas of its tasks and responsibilities. The IB was thus able to address itself to the complex security needs of a modern, democratic and forward looking nation, successfully withstanding the vicissitudes of the system and time. The groundwork laid by them has enabled a string of their dedicated successors to build up the IB into a sophisticated intelligence apparatus in the succeeding decades. Some of the stalwarts who built up the IB brick by brick are: M. M. L. Hooja, R. K. Kapoor, H. A. Barari, M. K. Narayanan, R. P. Joshi and V. G. Vaidya etc.

Today, the Intelligence Bureau has to deal with a myriad of challenges such as terrorism, subversion and insurgency on the one hand, and espionage and subliminal attempts to undermine the democratic fabric of the country by external agencies, on the other. The organisation carries out forward and counterintelligence operations against any incursion from hostile neighbouring countries or any of their client states. It maintains a lonely vigil through penny-packet posts on the Sino-Indian, Indo-Pak and Indo-Burma land borders, and also keeps track of developments and movements on the eastern and western sea borders of the country in the field or counter-intelligence, the IB has to deal with a far greater, number of hostile intelligence agencies than any of its counterparts in other countries. There are no East-West or North-South divides in the area of spying and espionage, and while the nation sleeps, the operatives of the IB have to remain vigilant as a substantial part of espionage activity takes place in the hours of darkness. As for its successes in this sphere, despite the liberal traditions of the country and other handicaps the organisation’s record of busting spy rings and capture of espionage agents has indeed been gratifying.

The responsibility of collection of foreign intelligence was given to the IB during the Second World War period. However, the organisation made tremendous strides within a few years and by the mid-1950s concrete intelligence about Pakistan’s intentions and capabilities for instance, had achieved a sophisticated dimension. With India developing into a major nation-State, strategic intelligence collection outside the country was handed over to a new organisation carved out from the IB, as a whole-time responsibility, in September 1968. It is known as Research and Analysis Wing of the cabinet secretariat.

In the sphere of combating insurgency, notwithstanding the initial lack of sufficient experience, the IB had been able to devise, by the late 1950s and more so from the mid-1960s, a counter-insurgency doctrine of its own. It is substantially different from the conventional wisdom based on the Malaysian or Vietnamese experience and has enabled the IB to play a significant role in containing insurgent movements in several parts of the country. In the arena of counterterrorism, another relatively new field of action, the IB again displayed quick adaptability. Despite major handicaps including its rather thin organisational spread on the ground, the Bureau has striven hard to make its contribution in this major war of the nation against the most serious threat to the country’s stability and peace.

The security functions of the IB are perhaps one of the less publicised areas of its tasks. Personnel and document security are today among the most important responsibilities of a security agency in any modern nation-state. In this sphere of its tasks, the security checks and vetting procedures of the Bureau and the countermeasures evolved by it have been acknowledged by several foreign agencies as amongst the best in the world, excepting perhaps those possible in a totalitarian or authoritarian society. Security of key industries and vital installations is also an important charge of the IB. The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) was born out of the industrial security wing of the IB. Besides its responsibilities relating to conceptualisation of threats and devising of counter measures to protect these national assets against sabotage and other disruptive attempts, the Bureau has a built-in provision for an early warning system whenever portents of serious industrial unrest are present.

Similarly the border security duties of the IB, especially along Pakistan border were taken over by the newly created Border Security Force. The Indo-Tibet Border Police and the Special Services Bureau also owe their birth out of IB’s existing wings concerning these areas of national security. The IB is, therefore, naturally described as the mother of all intelligence and security agencies of India.

In the sphere of VIP security, the IB is responsible not only for the perception and conceptualisation of all threats to important personages including the Prime Minister, President and other Indian dignitaries as well as other internationally protected personalities, but also for drawing up the ‘Blue Books’ and other guidelines for ensuring their security. Later a specialist VIP security agency, the Special Protection Group was created to cater to security needs of listed VIPs.

In its role as the premier intelligence-cum-security agency of the country, the IB has to service the various Ministries and Departments of the union Government with timely intelligence inputs and advice on all aspects of national security. Ever since their inception in 1935 the IB’s field units have sought to play a somewhat similar role vis-a-vis the state governments. However, IB’s cooperation with state intelligence units mainly concerned security matters and activities of the main political parties like the Indian national Congress, Communist Party of India, Muslim League, and Hindu Mahasabha etc. After independence when Congress governments ruled everywhere exchanges between the IB and state intelligence units appeared to be smooth. However, with the advent of non-Congress government in various states such cooperation has remain limited to national security concerns and for other matters the central and state intelligence units functioned (still functioning) independently. Even in internal security areas degree of cooperation depends on the colours of the state governments (such as communal parties, sectarian parties etc). Over the period, threat of jihad and violent activities by Pakistani and Bangladeshi jihadi tanzeems have paved the ways for better liaison between the state and central intelligence units. This will be emphasized later.

Such efforts, aimed at an interchange of information to effectively meet any grave threat to public peace and internal security, take place at several levels-regular interactions with Chief Ministers and Governors, maintaining regular liaison with the Chief and Home Secretaries, and direct involvement with the DG Police and State Intelligence and police officials.

On its part, the IB has also been receiving qualified cooperation and support in the performance of its national security tasks, from various state governments. Differences in political ideology and attitude towards various segments of the population often modulate the degree of cooperation. The help provided by the State police and intelligence outfits to the IB constitutes a very vital link in the national security chain.

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The Intelligence Bureau is a pyramidal organisation. The Director, IB is supported at his headquarters by Special Directors, Additional Directors, Joint Directors, Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors. The cascading ranks flow down to Deputy Central Intelligence Officer, Assistant Central Intelligence Officer (Gr. 1 and 2). Basically the structural formation follows the police formations with the Security Assistant (constable) at the lowest ladder. The staffing pattern is divided into two broad divisions: Intelligence Generation cadre and Technical cadre.

In the central core the structural layout is divided on functional, territorial and operational basis. For example a particular Additional Director/Special Director can be responsible for supervising certain geographical areas and subject-desks. Desks cover the entire gamut of national life, right from political parties to student unions, trade unions, NGOs, to communal and other disruptive activities. The numerous desks are clubbed under common denominative hierarchical lines applied to interrelated subjects. Subjects like ethnic insurgency, religious terrorism, ideological terrorism (Naxal) are dealt with by subject desk as well as Operations Desks. The details are so innumerable that it would confuse a common reader. Suffice it to say that all spheres of human activities inside and in the neighbourhood of the country are allocated to the charter of duties of the Intelligence Bureau.

It must be added that newer dimensions of coverage are added from time to time keeping in view the windows of threat to national security. For example in recent times the unpleasant task of monitoring of VHF, HF communications (mobile phones etc), Internet communications and Website activities have been added to the domain of coverage. These are done to keep vigil on the forces which use these electronic communication methodologies to carry out subversive activities.

The Sky is not the limit as far as growing charters of duties of the IB are redefined from time to time. It keeps on expanding the Universe does.

In the States IB units are designated as Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau. These units are headed mostly by a zonal Additional Director with Joint Directors, Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors manning different states. It is the age of top heavy administrative work philosophy. The work earlier done by a Joint Assistant Director is now being done by a Joint Director or Deputy Director. Pyramidal upgradation of ranks has put the IB hierarchy at par with the State police and other administrative services of the Union and the States. However, it is difficult to asses if such upgradation has added better cutting edges to the grassroots level functionaries, who remain responsible for producing the uncut diamonds of intelligence inputs.

The Intelligence Bureau gathers intelligence on given subjects and from allocated target areas through applications of Tradecraft. Tradecrafts are both general and technical. The General Intelligence generation depends on intensive training of the grassroots level operators in the technology of intelligence generation mainly through Human Intelligence (HumInt), which uses human agents for collection of intelligence. The tradecraft matters are very complicated and are as harder nuts to crack as the equation of a physical or chemical scientist.

Tradecraft also include Technical Intelligence(TechInt).It is a vast universe of intelligence tools, which include Signal Intelligence (SigInt), Electronic Intelligence (ElecInt), Photo Intelligence, Satellite Intelligence, Remote Sensing Intelligence etc. Specially trained officers are grilled over fires over years to shapeup good TechInt officers. In short TechInt is an important accessory to HumInt; in some cases TechInt can superceded the authenticity of HumInt.

Internal intelligence generation, as stated earlier encompass all conceivable state, political, group and organised activities of the nation. Coverage of communal conflagration and simmering discontents are covered with as much alacrity as possible.
While intelligence generation is an important aspect of the IB, it is also responsible for denying intelligence to the intelligence agencies of other countries which are constantly engaged in stealing intelligence from India and in carrying out sabotage and subversion. This is in the domain of Counterintelligence. Specially designed Tradecrafts are used in Counterintelligence works of the IB. This is as vast a field as intelligence generation is. The IB is solely responsible for Counterintelligence on Indian soil, though the R&AW has taken over limited CI works in Indian domain basically to protect its own assets and operations.

The other important aspect in which the IB specialises is the field of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and counter-sabotage and subversion related operations. This vast area include ethnic problems like the Naga insurgency, separatist movements of ULFA and the not so old terror regime let loose by the a group of misdirected and misguided Sikhs.

Intelligence operations in Kashmir combine intelligence generation, counterintelligence, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Besides Kashmir, such combination of operations is often demanded of the IB in other insurgency prone areas.

Another major area of operation is border intelligence. With vast borders with China, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan India are very vulnerable. It is not known to countrymen that young IB officers have to compulsorily spend several years on inaccessible and dangerous border posts to gather border intelligence. These officers are grilled over ice in the IB’s in-house mountaineering institute. Three IB officers had earned the distinction of climbing the Everest Peak.

The other important task that is the spin off of worldwide Islamic resurgence and Jihad sponsored by inimical forces in Pakistan and Bangladesh has challenged the intrinsic efficiency of the IB. This new dimension of national security has brought with it several complications which require a separate volume to narrate. However, the IB has risen up to the new challenges and has started encompassing the roots, branches and twigs of such movements. It must be understood that Jihad in Indian soil is the spin off of Jihad movements in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Problems with roots in neighbouring countries are tougher to tackle. If one asks me to give a rating to the IB as an old operative I should give it Three Stars; not bad for the handicaps with which the agency has to work.

It is often alleged that IB generally fails in catering advance information about Islamic jihadist operations, schemes and operations. It must be remembered that in most cases the operations are conceived by the ISI of Pakistan and DGFI of Bangladesh (in some cases groups draw direct inspiration from Al Qaeda). Once the operations are conceived and targets are selected the ISI and the DGFI confer franchise to the jihadi tanjeems like the Lashkar-e-Tayeba, Harkat-ul-Jiahd-al Islami along with resources and often with assistance of ‘sleeper cells’ in the target areas of the targeted operations. The ‘sleeper cells’ might belong to the foreign intelligence agencies and the tanzeems.

Therefore, it is difficult for the IB to generate intelligence from neighbouring countries. Moreover, the jihadis belong to Muslim community, especially Sunni Muslims owing allegiance to Wahhabi and Salafi ideologies. Brutally speaking the IB has very limited access to the Muslim community. Despite best efforts it has not been possible to attract Muslim candidates to the cutting edge level of the Intelligence Bureau.

Despite all these handicaps the IB has been vastly successful in infiltrating the jihadi ‘sleeper cells.’

The faceless operators of the IB are now faced with serious internal security challenges. Some of these challenges are rooted in the history of the country, which it inherited from the British rulers. India was divided on the basis of religion. India was reorganized on the basis of language. However, India’s ethnic geographic maps were not researched and redrawn with imagination and political vision. The Naga insurgency was a spin off British legacy and ethnic and Christian exclusivism introduced by the British. Very little attention was paid to the tribal aspirations of the Mizo, Bodo-Kachari, Tripuri, Khasi-Garo and Meitei-non-Naga tribals of Manipur. The ambience of insurgency erupted due to such political shortsightedness, which was expeditiously exploited by Pakistan and China and assorted rebellious Burmese tribes. India is still suffering from these wounds. It can be said to the credit of the IB that its faceless officers rendered exemplary services to the nation in these ethnic-resurgent areas.

Again in the Northeast Assam was pushed to the path of insurgency/terrorism due to failure of the consecutive state and central governments to prevent the milling waves of illegal immigration of Pakistani/Bangladeshi Muslim population to Assam (West Bengal included). Added factors were severe economic imbalance, economic and administrative neglect and general unconcern of the people of the Hindi heartland and Southern peninsula about the people of the Northeast. To the people of the Northeast Indian officers, police forces and army were tokens of foreign occupation. Never the heartbeats of the people of the Northeast and the rest of the country pulsated together. The IB has given good account of its presence in Assam despite several built in deficiencies.

Other areas of national fault lines that threw serious challenges to the IB are Punjab terrorism and the present phase of Maoist movement in several states. Punjab problem was a self-inflicted injury, caused by unholy political competition by the Congress and the Akali Dals. Pakistan took advantage of the disastrous approaches adopted by he political forces and the governments and supported the terrorists for nearly ten years. It must be added to the credit of the IB that its functionaries gave excellent coverage and helped both in the peace-making process and operational intelligences.

The present phases of Maoist movements, though treated as a police problem, are basically and intrinsically connected to lack of practical and equitable land reforms, rural job generation, promotion of rural-home-based traditional industries, failure to transmit the urban developmental benefits to the rural areas and political malfeasance. Centuries of exploitation and post-independence neglect and unimaginative economic programming and implementation have created economic void, social imbalance and lack of basic state infrastructures. Rural poors are becoming poorer, whatever the government data might project. The IB has no other option but to work within the given system and socio-economic-political ambience. Under these tough circumstances the IB has not been successful to generate expected level of intelligence. There are several reasons for these limitations.

It is often alleged that IB is misused for political purposes. I have revealed some of these allegations in my book Open Secrets. Yes. All ruling parties misuse the IB for political intelligence, for mere political survival and for stymieing political opposition. Political horse trading is an integral part of our fledgling democracy. Institutions like IB are also used for these purposes. Such misuses take place because agencies like IB, R&AW, CBI etc are not regulated by any Act of the Parliament. These important tools of governance are not accountable to anyone except their controlling ministries, the Home and the Prime Minister. Agencies like the CIA, FBI and MI5 are regulated by Acts of the highest lawmaking bodies. In spite of that the CIA and the MI6 were misused by the USA and UK for waging war on Iraq. However Watchdog bodies of the Congress, Senate and the Parliament had exposed the misdeeds of the governments of the USA and UK and rectifiable measures were adopted. It is high time for India to make these agencies accountable and provide them with protective armours of the Law. Democracy without Accountability is worse than military dictatorship.

The intelligence Bureau does not work in isolation. The Director Intelligence Bureau is regarded as the topmost police officer of the country. The IB maintains regular liaison with the state police intelligence branches and internal intelligence units of the Para Military Forces and the three wings of the Military Intelligence. It has regular interaction with the R&AW on matters of national security aspects.

The level and degree of cooperation between the state police intelligence and the IB waxes and wanes with the political colour of the governments. Certain states ruled by certain ideological parties, caste based parties and regional parties do not always cooperate to the fullest extent, wherever their turfs of special interests are concerned.
However, since 1993 continuous are being made to bring about perfect coordination and smooth exchange of intelligence. The annual conference of DGPs/IGPs and CPOs try to iron out areas of differences and bring about smoother coordination. A multi-agency coordination body has been established to ensure smooth exchange of intelligence and operational coordination. The National Security Council also coordinates all efforts to develop healthier bridges between the IB and the state police intelligence units and other central intelligence agencies. In that sense, the IB has become the important focal point of internal security parameters of the country.

Following spectacular terrorist strikes the media and general public often lay allegations of intelligence failure. The word ‘failure’ is limited to a particular incident. It must be remembered that the jihadi tanjeems from the neighbouring countries have set up extensive networks inside India. It is not possible for IB alone, without parallel inputs from the R&AW and the state police intelligence units locate, identify and neutralise these jihadi terrorist modules set up in India. Inputs about planning and execution schemes originating from Pakistan and Bangladesh are expected from the R&AW. There is a big coverage gap on this front. Moreover, it must be understood that in terrorist warfare intelligence agencies remain ahead of the terrorist outfits in nearly 50% of cases. In rest 50% cases the terrorists succeed in evading timely detection. An average of fifty percent success is rated very high in guerrilla and urban terror warfare.

The IB suffers from several drawbacks: lack of ground spread, manpower, resource crunch and hesitant support from political system of the country. In a scale of 100, threat to internal security has increased by 80%. Compared to that IB’s resource bases have increased only by 15%. How can a country fight jihadist thrusts from in and outside without the political government equipping it with required levels of resources? Lack of political will, for whatever reasons it might be, is at the root of weakness of our intelligence mechanism. The Intelligence Bureau is doing a fine job within the limitations of the system and resource constraints.

The same criteria are applicable to the state police intelligence agencies also. Some painful and hesitant steps have been initiated for some sorts of police reforms. Hopefully some reforms measures for state intelligence branches would be considered.

It is high time that the government of India considers initiating Acts of Parliament for the agencies like IB, R&AW and CBI, carry out internal reforms, provide better sinews of operations and make these institutions accountable to the people’s forum. Finally these agencies should also be freed from political interference.

This is a special article for marking the occasion of Indian “Intelligence Bureau” completing 120 years of service.

Copy Right @ Maloy K Dhar. Email: maloy_d@hotmail.com

Maloy Krishna Dhar is the former joint director of the Intelligence Bureau and author of many books on on Indian intelligence.