The Indian Army 4/3rd Raids on Pakistani Penga Post in 1965
The Battalion was holding the Cease Fire Line (now LoC) on Chhawa West in the general area Ramulidhara in the 25 Infantry Division Sector of J&K. From our piquets, at night, we could see the glow of the lights of the Mangla Dam on the Jhelum in POK. Around the period October 1964 to May 1965, the Division Area Of Responsibility (AOR) was very live. Taking pot shots at each other was very commonplace. Ambushes were frequent, and it was only a fortnight earlier that a Road Opening Party (ROP) of 4/3 G R had been ambushed by the wily Baluchis right inside our area. The leading scout had been hit, but he fired back emptying his SLR magazine into the fleeing enemy before collapsing owing to loss of blood. After last light, it was a sight to see enemy tracer from heavy automatics lining and criss-crossing the valley. The AOR was a veritable a cauldron of daily spats between the Pakis (9 Balauch) and us. Raids were the order of the day and the general policy was that the raiding of an Indian post had to be replied by a counter raid in POK within 24 hours as a reprisal. The Penga Raid was conceived out of this policy.
Around 14th or 15th May 65 , one of the Battalions in the Kalal Gap –14 Jat– was mauled badly and about 5 bodies of the Jats were taken away. Later their heads were lopped off and propped up on stakes in a macabre exhibition of senseless brutality, and displayed. The Battalion redeemed its honour in full measure in a counter raid.
It was but natural that Maj Chanda should draw the short straw. No – the short straw did not even figure. But it should give the readers an indication of his popularity with the battalion command headquarter. It was Maj Surinder Kshatri; who as the Alpha Company Commander, the Company right opposite the Penga Post that was located just across the CFL; who had first mooted the operation to the then CO Lt Col R K Duleep Sinh. He had appreciated the three bumps on the feature held by, perhaps, a platoon, if the reports by the UN MOGIP are taken to be true. Chanda was officiating for him as he was away on compassionate leave when the balloon went up for the raid.
24 hours were given to get ready for the raid and Chanda was to give briefing on the evening of 17th May 1965. He did so around 1700h, off a black board sketch on Piquet 564, Sansar. The Second-in- Command; Maj Bhagwant Singh Gill (an armoured corps ranker who had seen service in Java & Sumatra, earning a Mentioned-in-Despatches; later transferred to 2 JAKRIF as CO, & later was their Centre Commandant as Colonel) reminded the whole lot not to come back with out a positive identification like a weapon, or even the tauko (head) of the enemy or even a PoW. The new CO; Lt Col SDS Yadava (retired a Maj Gen), further enjoined all to up hold the good name & honour of the paltan by making the raid a successful venture. The SM, Dil Bahadur Gurung ( ex-2/3 rd, earned a Mention-in –Despatches in Italy, later retired as Hony Capt; who had the unique privilege of being given a ‘guard of honour’ in Gambhir base; 120 Inf Bde; on retirement) as further gingered up the boys reminding them of the deeds of valour of their forefathers, with many a hoi ki hoi nas.
Individual group commanders, got to know the men allotted to them, briefed them on the ground, giving all an opportunity to have good look at their objectives & routes, and tied up minor details. 2/Lt A K Sharma (Sam) discovered that he had Hav Aspur (later died in a MT accident, as a Subedar, in the Lohit Frontier Division of NEFA, when young Mike Lahiri (later retired as Lt Gen, PVSM; was the CO) of the Sniper Section as his No 2; along with Hav Hum Bahadur (later retired as Subedar) and Rfn Dash Bahadur of A Coy, as also Rfn Kharka Bahadur of the MT. Apart from Aspur, who had been his instructor in a unit PWO pre-course cadre and knew him some what, Sam had never met the others. So it was really warmed the cockles of his heart to see them operate as they did in the execution stage of the raid, which; since raising in October 1962; was the first blooding of the paltan, and that too in an offensive action.
2/Lt A K Sharma
Just to preserve the notions of security, even the Adjutant was left in the dark. 2/Lt Paotinlal Gangte ( later, DIG manipur Rifles), a Manipuri kuki; the old soldier, that he was and also the one great one for a sense of history and the momentous occasion, kept merrily clicking away on his camera. Sam has a collection of these snaps.
Besides the men, the following Officers and JCOs took part:
(a) Major J ‘Guruji’Chanda - Raid Party Commander
(b) 2/Lt ‘Paoche’ Gangte -Support Group Commander
(c) 2/Lt AK ‘Sam’ Sharma - Assault Group Commander No. 1
(d) 2/Lt ‘Mota’ Yogendra Singh - Assault Group Commander No. 3
(e) Sub Rik Bahadur Gurung (later selected to be SM) -Assault Group Commander No. 2
(f) 2/Lt O P Verma -Fire Base 1
(g) 2/Lt L Colney ( later, IAS; Secy Education, Nagaland Govt) -Fire Base 2
Troops set out for Penga immediately after last light, and after an uneventful approach march in the summer moonshine, arrived at the RV after about an hour and a half. It so happened that Sub Mandhoj Gurung of B Coy got annoyed by some thing one of the johnnies had done, and in the pre-combat jitters got excited and began nervously chaffing at him at the top of his voice, little realizing that the enemy was then with in earshot. This was to prove almost disastrous as events began to unfold. Whatever, soon enough Gangte confirmed on the radio that his support group was in position, hence the various groups took off for the enemy posts, in the order of march spelt out by the Raid Commander in his briefing. They were headed for the release point at the base of the Penga feature. Intention was for all groups to re-check all-correct and on a given signal by the raid Commander the groups were to raid (read ‘assault’, and hope for the opportunity to come their way to nab a Paki or grab his weapon or some thing) their respective objectives.
As it actually happened, surprise was lost much before the groups could reach their Release Points, owing mainly due to Mandhoj Gurung’s out bursts. Therefore, it should have been any body’s guess as to what kind of a reception to expect, yet being young at heart and in high spirits we were hoping for the best. The enemy did not; however oblige by being nice, but opened up with all their weapons including two or three Browning medium machine guns firing from the flanks and depth as soon as the gurkhas got into their small arms range in the partly dry nullah bed. He brought to bear very heavy, intense and very overwhelming effective fire on them.
The expected happened, as with all troops who have never been into battle before: they all went to ground. Chanda had no option but to give the yell to rush the objectives without getting an opportunity to orchestrate the show. Not that it would have mattered. Nobody got up. Having come all the way, Chanda decided that the only way to get the show going was to charge the post himself and so he did and got the desired results, but only after much butt-kicking and haranguing of the troops ( Aphno beizzati garuncha..?! Gorkhali ko beizzati garaunch..?!!! paltan ko beizzzati garauncah..???!!! uth uth uuuth!! ) by the young officers, who; much to their credit; did not take cover, but kept standing in full view of the enemy in bright moon-light good enough to enable aimed fire. One by one the men broke cover…. all got up and were herded and hounded by the leaders towards their objectives. Sub Rik Bahadur Gurung was to Chanda’s right, Sam was to go for the Left Bump and Yogi was supposed to go for the Right Bump to capture the much coveted and prized enemy .30 Browning.
After Chanda reached the release point towards the Center bump, Sam came rushing after him herding his group close to him towards the Left bump. Chanda and his buddy were about 10 to 12 yards ahead of him. These two were exhorting; with the choicest of Punjabi expletives; the others to get up and have go at the enemy. From the enemy posts itself the enemy was; apart from bringing down effective small arms fire and throwing all kind of shit at the gurkhas ; also giving vent to his pique spewing an unending stream of urdu –cum-multani invective and damnation in the fires of hell for the kafirs. Sam took Chanda also to be the enemy and fired his full 9 mm Sten magazine at him. It was sheer providential that not one bullet found its mark. As soon as he realized what he had done he retched violently, and vomited mostly on himself as he later narrated. He could not have done better. However, to his credit he continued with his charge to the Left Bump from its flanks and rear.
He went in blazing away from his carbine, in a regular Rambo-style; throwing hand grenades as he closed in. Rfn Kharke was to his left and to his right was Rfn Dash Bahadur. Aspur and Hum Bahadur provided the rear protection to the then this very Young Officer; he was only 19/20 then and looked even younger. As he approached an enemy bunker he noticed an enemy soldier descending the reverse slope of the Left Bump, his rifle on guard, but unknown to him then, also badly jammed! Sam took his slung carbine off his shoulder, and got on to the ‘ taan shastra’ position him self to fire at him. To his horror and utter consternation he discovered that it would not fire! It had jammed as, sadly, was the wont of this weapon. He, therefore got ready to bayonet the approaching enemy soldier. Noticing the enemy, lunging determinedly towards his commander, Rfn Kharka Bahadur, holding his sten gun from its muzzle end clubbed the enemy on his head, with its wooden butt. The enemy soldier wobbled, and even as he did so, Sam snatched his rifle and yelled at his comrades to withdraw to the RV. Sam retched and vomited yet again under the weight of the additional weapon. Seeing his plight, Rfn Dash Bahadur got hold of him by the arm and pulled him along with him, as they both doubled to the RV. Sam was calling out the names of his buddies as he passed the Chanda in the Release Point. This was to ascertain their being all correct with him.
2/Lt A K Sharma came out of Penga with the only success of the operation: a 303 rifle, that he had taken away from an enemy Pathan soldier.
In the meanwhile, Sub Rik Bahadur Gurung, went to the Right bump and inflicted severe damage on the enemy. According to him, he bayoneted three of the enemy and killed a few of them. While all this was going on, CHM Sidhiman Gurung, of ‘A’ coy came back and told Chanda that he was wounded. Chanda asked him what happened and he replied ” Huzoor, Subedar sahab le pet man bayonet ghonp diyo “. That brought down Rik Bahadur’s claim to two. Chanda sent Sidhiman Gurung back to the RV all by himself. Had no time for niceties such as finding any body to accompany him. Later he was carried piggy back to Sansar, by the johnnies in turn.
Yogi could not make it to the enemy Browning emplacement. He and his group were pinned down by heavy fire from the post.
By this time, it was between 0030 and 0100 and Chanda blew the whistle for the groups to return. This time there was immediate response. Once the whole thing was over, some one asked him as to why he had blown the whistle so soon. To them it had seemed only about 5 to 10 minutes had passed since the operation had started. In actual fact, the operation had taken about 25 minutes or more.
The support group stayed put, while all the three assault groups withdrew to a pre-determined RV to regroup and it was then discovered that Rfn Kharka Bahadur Gurung was missing from Sam’s group. Chanda asked Sam to go back with his group and look for him. Sub Rik Bahadur was asked to accompany them. Sam was leading his boys back again, only to discover that no one was following him! He was wild, but Sub Rik Bahadur came to his ‘rescue’, and taking a 2 inch mortar from its number, told Sam; ” Saab, ap apne admi le kar dhundene jao. Main ap ko yahan se covering fire deta hun (sir, you take your men for search, I will give you a cover fire)”. Sam was aghast at such conduct from a very senior JCO, but as he had a job to do, therefore herded his boys (all except one 08 Hav Hum Bdr who feigned ‘ tauko dhukhe cha’-headache) back on their feet and trotted out back towards the rear of the Left Bump, where he had last seen Kharke, physically.
They looked around for him, in all the possible nooks and crannies, the nullahs, behind bushes of rhododendron, the stunted pine and bramble, but in vain. Hav Aspur Gurung even called out Kharke’s name. At this, some of the enemy started to wail out cries of , “Bhago, Bhago, kafir phir aa gaye hain (run run, kafirs have come again)”. Aspur let go a long burst from his Sten Machine Carbine, in their direction, and withdrew.
This futile search was reported to the CO by Chanda. He cleared it with Brig UBS Verma, the 80 Infantry Brigade Commander and ordered him to send another search party. Sam volunteered for this one, being his moral duty. Mota Yogi and Gangte, being the comrades in arms in every sense of the term, volunteered as well. Chanda had no option but to accede to their request. They retraced their steps to the Left Bump and its rear, but in vain once again. Sam, Gangte and Yogi, thought nothing of sitting down for a pow-wow right in front of the Left Bump, and examined the options open to them. It was decided to send back Yogi to report back the situation to Chanda. Yogi showed reluctance to leave Sam & Gangte behind in very close proximity of the enemy. Sam lost his shirt on him and drawing his khukri hit him on his back-side with a an admonishment-cum-command, ‘Yogi, do as you are told and quit worrying about my safety. We can look after our selves. There are a umber of folds in the ground and the bullets will not be able to get us”.
Yogi did as he was bid, only to rejoin after some time with the orders that yet another search had been ordered by the Brigade. Sam was back again, this time followed only by one NK Kharka Bahadur of A Company, who was not even part of his assault group; but was his gaonle as he later mentioned. The two scoured the terrain yet again, but again in vain. Sam was held back by NK Kharka Bdr when he insisted on entering enemy bunkers for the search, with the hissed comment,” Kya kar raha hai Saab? Ham ko marvana hai..?.ap ko dushman pakar kega, Chalo wapis (what are you doinf si? you want us killed? the enemy will catch us, lets go back)”. The matter was reported all the way up the channel, with orders for yet another search. This time no one volunteered. Sam went in again this time all alone and with out even his Sten Machine Gun; armed only with a drawn 11 inch khukri.
The raid party was day-lighted by the time permission could be obtained from higher HQs to finally abandon search and pull out. This was just as well as the Pakistanis were homing on to their location and their infantry mortars had almost managed to pin point them. To achieve a clean break, Chanda ordered Sub Mandhoj Gurung to engage the enemy bunkers on the reverse slope of the Left Bump. The JCO proceeded to bring down a heavy volume of HE fire with the 2 inch mortars, with a lot of gusto and verve. Nk Jhabi Lal (later retired as Hony Lt) on Sansar, was contacted on the wireless and ordered to open up with the 3 inch mortars behind the Bumps to prevent any of the enemy reinforcements joining them as also to keep the enemy heads down to prevent effective fire on the raid party. They did their job very well and indeed no reinforcements came. These mortars took a heavy toll on the enemy and it was reported on the UN MIGOP channels, that it accounted for almost all of the enemy 9 killed and 27 wounded.
Half way back to the piquet, as per the pre-determined time the Raid commander started enquiring whether support group had started withdrawing. He could not raise Paoche on the wireless, though he called out his call sign several times. When he could not raise Gangte even after 30 minutes, he got worried. But within about 5 minutes thereafter Paoche gave the signal that he had started withdrawing. Much relieved, the complete raiding party got back to the picket somewhere between 0300 and 0400h. Later, on enquiry, Paoche revealed that his group had been pinned down by enemy fire and for sometime he just could not move. So he lit his torch and threw it a distance away which had desired effect of the enemy fire shifting on to the lighted torch just as he thought it would. All that was excellent and very nice but after he managed to extricate his group, he had gone went back to retrieve his torch! That’s why the delay in his coming on the wireless!!
The raid party had to halt frequently to enable change of ‘piggy backying’ of CHM Sidhiman Gurung. A JCO, Jemadar Kundhoj Gurung of A coy had also been wounded by grenade shrapnel; he had also to be helped out. Chanda was fagged out half way, and wanted to be left behind. Sam & Gangte would have nothing of this from him & kept coaxing, pleading and goading him literally to take the next step up the mountainside. Sam even put his head to the back of his waist and kept shoving and pushing him up from behind for quite some time. It was a relief for all to make it back to the FDLs after a long last.
As they sat down for the debriefing by about 0600 or 0700, things were gloomy and Chanda could he feel the glare of the CO burning his back for coming back without Kharke and his weapon. He did not even shake any body’s hand, as was customary, he was so disappointed and angry. Anyway the deed was done. While debriefing was going on, someone noticed Fat Yogi’s jungle hat. It was jungle hats those days, as helmets would have been noisy. A bullet had cleanly passed through it without messing up Fat Yogi’s forehead. The jungle hat was supposed to be kept for future but insensitive as we to history – it was not. So was the rifle Sam brought back, but for one regulation or the other, this trophy also did not materialize. A point of interest here: whilst inspecting it, it took the unit armourer all his savvy and skill to strip the bolt of it; it was jammed so hard!
Later that day or the day following, came the news of enemy casualties. Next day Sam did find the Penga post abandoned but for a few enemy soldiers. Through the field glasses he clearly noticed drove upon drove of turkey buzzards as they perched on the parapets of the post and partied and feasted on the enemy dead. Since they were at a higher elevation, the battlefield could be seen quite clearly. Sam, did not immediately leave for Kalsian, where he was doing the Div Commando cadre under Maj Mukhtiar Singh VrC of 15 Dogras, but stayed back on Sansar, the whole of 18 May 1965, in the hope of seeing Rfn Kharke making it back some how even as the enemy kept shelling all the routes to the Indian FDLs the whole day. Sub Rik Bahadur, the senior JCO of A company, almost admonished him by saying ” Leptin Saab, ap apne piquet men kyon nahi jata hai? Baqi sab log chala gaya hai. Mara hua admi kabhi wapis nahin ata. (lt sir, why don’t you go to your piquet? Everybody else has already gone. Dead men don’t come back.)”
After last light the Pakis tried to close in, on to the Indian piquets, 564, 565 and 566, but were detected, and engaged by 3-inch mortar defensive fire. Nk Jabi Lal of the 3-inch mortars, kept his mortar numbers busy the whole night.
The news of the Pakistani casualties cheered up the Battalion to quite an extent particularly the Commanding Officer. Maj Gen Amrik Singh, GOC 25 Inf Div was clearly very happy with the results achieved by 4/3 G R and said so in his after action report to 15 Corps; a ‘candidly, plucky raid’ it was, he said. Recommendations for gallantry awards were called for in respect of one Officer, JCO, and OR each. Chanda recommended, Sam, Gangte, and Rfn Kharka Bdr. Sam suggested Chanda, and Nk Kharka Bdr. The CO put up Sam and Sub Rik Bdr for Vir Chakras, Nk Kharka Bdr & Rfn Kharke for Sena Medals.(Sam has managed to preserve the draft citations, which are now displayed in his den, the computer room). However, by the time any awards could be processed in the various echelons of command, the 1965 War broke out on 6 Sep 1965 ; hence merely only two commendations from the Army Chief came through as a net result! Sam was presented to the Army Commander Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh , VrC. Melvile de Mello of the AIR came to interview Sam. Meeting Sam for the first time after the Raid, OP Verma remarked,” Sam, so nice to see you alive and kicking. There was such a heavy firing that night, that, no one expected you to walk out of it on your two legs.”
That is how 4/3rd recalls the Penga Raid. One is reminded of a quote from Ernest Hemingway . Writing in the Introduction to ‘Men Against Fire’, he says; “As they get further and further from a war they have taken part in, all men have a tendency to make it as they wish it had been rather than how it really was. So every year in July, the anniversary of the month when I got the big wound, I read ‘The Middle Parts of Fortune’, and it all comes back to me as though it was not yesterday, nor long ago, but as though it were this morning before day light and you were waiting there dry mouthed, for it to start. ” More often than not, every year in May Sam rings up Chanda, in Kolkata from Delhi, and asks,”Guruji, what date is it?” and Chanda, when not in the cups, ask him in return, “No. What date indeed, is it the 17th already again?” and they wish it had ended not the way it did, but with the news of Kharke, reporting back to Sansar, in one piece; and not reported as ” Missing, Believed killed in action”; as he; indeed, was after that staff Court of Inquiry, presided over by Maj Chowdhury of 14 Jat, in Kutta and Billy that day in the end of May 1965. Kharke, whom we lost during the raid – the johnnie whose body the Pakistanis cut up into pieces the next day and took out in a procession – perhaps to hide their shame, hoping to compensate for their casualty figures of nine dead and 27 wounded or some such figures which were fed to the Indian by the representative of the UNMOGIP. Even in death, he served to drive fear into the Pakistanis since he was very strong, stocky and stout-hearted young gurkha soldier.
Many years later, when Sam was commanding 19 Assam Rifles in Mizoram, he composed two battle-ballads. These were: “Summer Moonshine” and ” Buzzard Feast”. These were calligraphed by his aging father, tastefully framed in Regimental colours, and sent to the Battalion when Karan (now Maj Gen, AVSM, SM) was CO. He had them put up in the bar. ‘ Summer Moonshine’ was carried in the ‘Sainik Samachar’ in their issue of 21 Aug 1988 . Both are hosted and are up and running on www.nawang.com . The Penga raid finds four pages (116 to 119) in the official history of the 3 Gorkha Rifles : “Flash Of the Khukri”.
One is fully aware that the raid was too insignificant in terms of its magnitude, historical import and tactical or strategic results or influence oe any lessons to be derived compared since to the various campaigns and acts of bravery by Indian Army units and individuals, since of far greater intensity and contribution towards Military History. But two things strike one. Firstly, the raid (pressed home as a frontal attack) did succeed. Secondly, the operation may have been puny but nothing can be taken away from the individual acts devotion to duty, bravery, heroism, raw courage and valour performed by some, that may have contributed to the Battalion’s legacy (much after the Penga Raid) in the various operational areas, that it found itself later.
A very senior officer wrote many decades later:-
1.An account of any operation to be useful should draw lessons. This helpsin being able to emulate positive critical actions and also to circumvent oravoid possibility of points showing organizational and individual weaknesses.Few of the possible lessons I have noticed are -
· Raids can not belaunched by ad-hoc parties without ensuring minimum bonding of everysoldier/element during rehersals.
· As is evident from the account, barring officers, it is difficult to pin point any individual showing full commitment in ensuring success plus. It was obvious even in the reluctance of participation in searching their comrade (Nk KB).
· Casualties were prevented due to absence of mine-field around Penga. Were you informed about it during briefing by SDS/BSS?
· Were reinforcement of raiding party catered for an eventuality of the majority getting trapped?
· It also highlights how a Bn Cdr should keep foremost the interests and safety of every soldier in his mind before acceding to foolhardy ventures ordered to be launched with out adequate preparations. He should have the courage to say NO even at the cost of career prospects.
· The CO should have displayed maturity and courage to suppress his love for the rifle Coy he once commanded while dealing with personnel matters. The primary responsibility is towards the good of the battalion (as whole). I am amazed how Rik Bahadur was even recommended for award and also became a SM later even after showing his reluctance to accompany an YO in the search for Nk KB. In fact, his behavior lateras SM reflected more of his weaknesses.
· Continuing in the veinof the previous observation, a CO rarely would not welcome a returning RaidParty with enthusiasm, even if it was an utter failure; in this case it was not.Again, were the repercussions on the career prospects the overwhelming concern?
2.Given the circumstances and the failure of than higher leadership, theleadership of Maj JChanda , Gangate and you were outstanding.
3.Finally, I can not but express my resentment; although, an academicexercise, at this point of time. I was part of the Paltan for so many years, Ihave not known all these details. Possibly an ‘underdog of those days’ did notdeserve to.
4.There is another lesson coming out of this, at that point of time itwould have been exceedingly helpful for the paltan to carry out a postmortem ofthese events, accepted the functional weakness that would have stood out,informed the leadership within the paltan and initiated corrective measures toresolve those specific issues. Instead, a lid was placed on crucial details. ButI would not now point any fingers, as I realize that perhaps the environment those days in the Army was not conducive for any such behaviour by a younger lo tof highly vulnerable upcoming Commanding Officers.
(The Writer Lt. Col A.K. ‘Sam’ Sharma is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy, Kharakvasla. Col Sharma was commissioned into the 3rd Gorkha Rifles of the Indian Army in Februray 1964, He retired in 1997 after serving for 33 years. A graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, he holds a MSc Degree in Defence Studies from the Madras University. This officer has been on the instructional staff of two of Indian Army’s premiere training institutes: the College of Combat; now known as the War College; (Directing Staff Junior Command Wing-1972-1975) and the Infantry School ( Senior Instructor, Platoon Commander’s Wing—1984-87) both located in Mhow (MP); where he taught tactics at the unit and sub-unit levels to students, some of who were from friendly foreign armies. He has also served at the world- renowned Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. Col Sharma can be contacted at aksh9@airtelbroadband.in)
You must be logged in to post a comment.