On Cultural differences
Midshipman James Hill: Other than the obvious differences in food and other things, there was a major difference in the cleaning routine. We were not able to take regular bath as the Chinese wanted to conserve the water on the ship. This is something I found very different from the Australian Naval ship. The people would get up in the morning, wash their faces, hands and other routine. After that they would get on with the other work. Another aspect was that you had to boil the water and then let it cool down to drink.

On Work differences
Midshipman James Hill: They had very strict discipline and very little midmanship freedom. The access to the ship was very restricted. Also there was a very little communication between the junior and senior officers onboard. In Australian ship, a junior officer can easily access the senor officer. On Chinese ship, there was a lot of bureaucracy. If a junior officer sends up a request, a reply comes very late.

PLA Navy training Ship Zheng He in Kochi

Frontier India: Do you think they deliberately did not perform the drills as you were on board?
Midshipman James Hill: No, I don’t think so.

On Competence
Midshipman James Hill: I found them as competent as any other navy as they too use similar equipment and navigational practices. As I noticed, their procedure for leaving and arriving at ports, are like we do. Similar procedures are followed.

On Living Space
Midshipman James Hill: Naval vessels are generally cramped, but, the Chinese ship wasn’t too crampedi I shared my cabin with 8 other Chinese. The Bunks were small and I could barely fit into it The locker was extremely small and I had a restriction of the personnel belongings I could carry. In Australian ships, we have much more space.

Frontier India: Anything else?
Midshipman James Hill: yeah, we had a great time on the ship.

Note: This article was first published on 23rd September 2010 in Frontier India.

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Project 75 I submarine project has been in conception since the tenure of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat. We have heard too many versions about this project. The first one is Amur 1650 being built at Hindustan Shipyard Limited, since Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) was expected to be awarded the Project 75 Scorpene project. The second version was an enlarged Scorpene since Indians would have already picked up submarine building skills from the project and India has options for 6 more Scorpene submarines. The third version was building an Indian design copied from Advanced technology vessel (ATV) or the nuclear submarine project Now called INS Arihant). This was denied by Indian navy. The fourth version was open tender.

With the introduction of Defence procurement Plan 2013 (DPP 2013), it is time for rethink. India today has almost all major components of P 75 I ready indigenously. Larsen & Toubro (L&T)’s UG NX5 & PLM Software Team center has the capability for Design & development of Structural & Engineering parts. With design inputs from DRDO and Indian Navy’s design outfit, L&T’s Submarine Design Centre created detailed engineering for nuclear submarine INS Arihant using the latest 3D Modeling and Product Data Management software (Read here). The company’s Heavy Engineering IC (HE IC) center has developed Underwater arrester system to test weapons system in INS Arihant. L&T built launchers have been used for firing of both underwater Brahmos Missile and nuclear capable 750 km K-15/B-05 missiles. The company also devised the firing circuit for BrahMos on the lines of Harpoon missile. (This makes future versions of INS Arihant fire both K-15 missiles and Brahmos, making it a potent submarine platform.) “The BrahMos missile is fully ready for fitment in the Project 75 I(india) submarines of the Indian Navy in vertical launch configuration which will make the platform ( Submarine) one of the most powerful weapon platforms in the world”. said Brahmos CMD &CEO Dr A Sivathanu Pillai, after the underwater Brahmos Launch.

Rear Admiral DM Deshpande, VSM, DG Project – 75 (Scorpenes) Naval Head Quarters, spoke about DRDO Fuel Cell AIP ( Read Here : Indian Navy LPD to feature electric propulsion, upbeat on DRDO Fuel Cell AIP) at the SMM India seminar and was confident it will be ready for implementation in Indian Navy HDW T-1500 submarine (Shishumar Class) upgrades and project 75 I. He also explained how the Scorpene project components can be used for Project 75I. This includes switchboards, transformers, circuit breakers etc. DCNS has been steadily building up Indian companies for the Scorpene project (Example: DCNS India signed an indigenization contract under the Scorpene submarines programme). Indian has its own torpedo projects like Advanced Light Torpedo (TAL) Shyena and heavyweight torpedo Varunastra by Naval Science and Technological Laboratory (NSTL).

India currently does not require a foreign design, but it definitely requires foreign consultancy, which DCNS and Rubin are willing to pitch in. The concern about delays and falling numbers of submarine fleet can be addressed by exercising the 6 additional Scorpene submarine option with DCNS, which will also keep MDL buzzing.

The I in P 75 I stands for India. Hopefully, the project is designigated to P 75 II (India Indigenous).

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India’s lessons – Can we create an Air-Mountain Warfare Doctrine?

Troops induction at a forward Air Force base near Siachen. Image: MoD

In summary, we need to create an integrated Air-Mountain Warfare doctrine. This then should also integrate Space dimension, Cyber dimension and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) dimensions for the border against China.

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Ashton Carter emphasised “India is destined to be a partner for United States,” “US would like to build Indian Military capabilities,” and “India wants to do it with technology development and co production.” Over a question if Indo – US defence technology initiatives and co production work with US export controls, Secretary Carter admitted that there have to be ‘export control reforms, which is a ‘technical problem’.

LCA Tejas to fly with GE-414 with ToT. Image: MoD

In reply to Frontier India email queries over progress since June 2012 call for cutting red tape in defence procurement, Lt. Col. Catherine Wilkinson, the Defense Press Officer for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (APSA), at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, replied “These are all important and ongoing areas of discussion with the GOI (Government of India). The DTI (Defense Trade Initiative) represents a considerable and concerted effort to move the defense trade relationship toward partnerships and collaborations and we are looking at ways to streamline defense cooperation to enable our two systems work better together. There are no easy fixes, but we are moving ahead in discussions with the GOI on potential co-production and co-development opportunities, including working with industry leaders to identify new opportunities, and we continue to keep our partners updated on such issues as ongoing U.S. export control reform efforts.”

Over the question if laws like CISMOA or BECA are being re-looked upon for change in immediate future, Lt. Col. Catherine Wilkinson said “I would refer to former Secretary Panetta’s remarks on this topic at IDSA in Delhi in June 2012: he does not see the absence of certain agreements as barriers to improving our relationship with India.”

The new Defence procurement Plan 2013 (DPP 2013) and emergence of Arms Trade Treaty has necessitated transfer of technologies and production to India. Deputy Secretary Carter was seen taking questions on outdated defence arms sales policies and technology transfer policies as suggestions. Clearly more needs to be done.

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While there were murmurs that Chuck Yeager flew sorties against Indian pilots during the war, it has been always officially denied. In his autobiography, Chuck claimed “I didn’t get involved in the actual combat because that would’ve been too touchy, but I did fly around and pick up shot-down Indian pilots and take them back to prisoner-of-war camps for questioning. I interviewed them about the equipment they had been flying and the tactics their Soviet advisers taught them to use. I wore a uniform or flying suit all the time, and it was amusing when those Indians saw my name tag and asked, “Are you the Yeager who broke the sound barrier?” They couldn’t believe I was in Pakistan or understand what I was doing there. I told them, “I’m the American Defense Rep here. That’s what I’m doing.”

The latest facebook post he admits “When I was flying with Pakistan in the war with India, Pakistan had F-104s and India had MiG-21s. I told the Pakistanis: Stay away from the MiG-21s. Don’t try to turn with a MiG 21 in an F-104. They didn’t listen and sure enough when the F-104s jumped the MiG-21s and tangled with them, the F-104s got shot down.”

Chuck Yeager’s Facebook Post admitting he flew with Pakistan during war with India

Few Posts down, he writes “Correction: Pakistan would have been invaded except for Nixon told Gandhi he had nuke weapons trained on India and the US would enter the war. I think the Pakistanis, other than the F-104 instance, were some of the best in the world (besides US) – because they got the most flying time each month.”

Chuck Yeager claims Nixon threatened Indra Gandhi with Nuclear Weapons

On being questioned by Armiral Arun Prakash’s claim of shooting down of his Beachcraft, Chuck said “Mostly rumor by an braggart Indian pilot.”

Chuck Yeager calls Admiral Arun Prakash a Braggart

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Shyam Saran, the Chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), India’s highest Security planning body, spoke about the topic ‘Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?’ at Habitat Centre, New Delhi on April 24, 2013. (Read Here) He touched upon the topic why Indian Armed forces have been kept away from the Nuclear loop.

“The thesis  that India’s nuclear deterrent is mostly symbolic is, for some, driven by the perception that India’s armed forces are not fully part of the strategic decision-making  process and that they play second fiddle to the civilian bureaucracy and the scientific establishment.  Even if this perception was true, and in fact it is not, one cannot accept that the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrence demands management by its military. The very nature of nuclear deterrence as practiced by a civilian democracy dictates that decisions relating to the nature and scope of the arsenal, its deployment and use, be anchored in the larger architecture of democratic governance. It is the civilian political leadership that must make judgments about domestic political, social and economic priorities as well as the imperatives imposed by a changing  regional and global geopolitical environment. The military must be enabled to provide its own perspectives and inputs, just as other segments of the state must do. Undoubtedly the military’s inputs and its advice would have to carry weight, especially in operational matters. But to equate exclusive military management of strategic forces, albeit under the political leadership’s overall command, as the sine qua non of deterrence credibility is neither necessary nor desirable.  One should  certainly encourage better civil-military relations and coordination. It may also be argued that the military’s inputs into strategic planning and execution should be  enhanced to make India’s nuclear deterrent more effective.  But one should not equate  shortcomings in these respects with the absence of a credible nuclear deterrent,”

he said.

At the same time he pointed out

“The National Command Authority is in charge of India’s nuclear deterrent. At its apex is the Political Council which is headed by the Prime Minister and includes all the ministerial members of the Cabinet Committee on Security such as the Ministers of Defence,Home and External Affairs. Below the Political Council is the Executive Council which is headed by the National Security Advisor and includes the Chiefs of the three armed forces, the C-in-C of India’s Strategic Forces Command, a three star officer, among others.There is an alternate National Command Authority which would take up the functions of nuclear command in case of any contingency when the established hierarchy  is rendered dysfunctional. The NCA has access to radiation hardened and fully secured communications systems where,too, redundancies have been put in place as back-up facilities.

“In order to support the NCA, a Startegy Programme Staff has been created in the National Security Council Secretariat to carry out general staff work for the National Command Authority. This unit is charged with looking at the reliability and quality of our weapons and delivery systems, collate intelligence on other nuclear weapon states particularly those in the category of potential adversaries and work on a perspective plan for India’s nuclear deterrent in accordance with a ten year cycle. The Strategy Programme Staff has representatives from the three services, from our Science and Technology establishment and other experts from related domains, including External Affairs. A Strategic Armament Safety Authority has been set up to review and to update storage and transfer procedures for nuclear armaments, including the submarine based component. It will be responsible for all matters relating to the safety and security of our nuclear and delivery assets at all locations. This will function under the direct authority of the NCA.

“The National Command Authority works on a two-person rule for access to armaments and delivery systems.

“Regular drills are conducted to examine possible escalatory scenarios, surprise attack scenarios and the efficiency of our response systems under the no first use limitation. Thanks to such repeated and regular drills, the level of confidence in our nuclear deterrent has been strengthened. Specialized units have also been trained and deployed for operation in a nuclearized environment.”

With So much involvement, should Indian Military micromanage the nuclear weapons?

Armed forces managing a strategic asset which is meant for civilian leadership use is not new. The best known example is MiG-25 Foxbat. Indian Air Force Jaguars and Mirage-2000′s have held practices to toss nuclear bombs without actually knowing the real dimension of the payload. Unlike single MIG-25 Sqn, the evolving Indian nuclear triad including aircraft’s, long range missiles and submarines need professional management under the civilian leadership and hence strategic forces have been carved up from defence services. The strategic forces manage the delivery modes and don’t seem to be responsible for the nuclear devices. With the exception of nuclear tipped missiles on Indian Submarines, rest of the triad components are not expected to be kept armed. Indian army is expected to lumber around with the Agni Missiles across the territory to practice and evade detection of launchers by prying eyes. INS Arihant is expected to accommodate a political officer among the submarine crew.

Since Indian geographic area is not so wide and threat not so imminent, India has no reason to assemble a NATO or WARSAW type nuclear delivery structure.

Then?

Unlike conventional weapon systems, the primary user of Indian nuclear weapon is the government of India, and not the armed forces. Similar to Indian Military, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the other two arms of the government play their role in maintenance of warhead components and nuclear cores respectively. There seems to be no need to create a new cadre among armed forces to cater to this requirement.

Some questions have arisen, for example if the scientists have to be embedded within the Agni Missile Units? Understandably, the question probably arises due to the lack of operational knowledge of the procedures involved. For example, who will mate the weapon? What if there is a miscommunication between the missile units and the DRDO/DAE personnel etc. Shyam Saran acknowledges secrecy leads to counter productiveness. “There is not enough data or information that flows from the guardians of our strategic assets to enable reasoned judgments and evaluations,…I would hope that the Government makes public its nuclear doctrine and releases data regularly,” he says.

The decision to arm or disarm the Agni’s or delivery aircraft and the modes require regular exercises for familiarisation. India is not likely to keep the delivery options stand by in readiness, except the nuclear submarines, and hence there is no requirement of embedding scientists who might remain idle during the majority of the time. The units are expected to begin intensive joint exercise in case a situation develops that require nuclear response well in advance. The policy makers have stated that the nuclear response might not be immediate, which leads us to the belief that India is not required to keep a operationally ready force. However, there is a need for survivability of nuclear command structure, which leads us to the belief that there might be embeds at strategic forces level, but not unit level.

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What is China doing?
Very systematically, China embarked on economic uplift of its largely agrarian society. So much so, that by end of the century it achieved its goals through sheer reverse engineering and very low cost manufacturing of world’s goods. “Made in China” became a symbol of minimum common denominator products all over the world – a remarkable achievement, indeed. However, the turn has come in last decade – back to converting economic achievement to military capability and global assertiveness. The first two decades of the new century are ear-marked to enhancing military capabilities along with expanding economic expansion. Next 30 years – from 2020 onwards – China will start the phase towards increasing its assertiveness in the world. The phase requires deep mining of Africa and complete control of the world by manufacturing everything that the world need. A remarkable twist to globalization – by playing the low-cost high-volume player initially then slowly but surely moving up to the high cost and high technology play to start defining the future. In this quest and plan, China needs a very strong military. It has to confront an extremely powerful foe in USA and its far-reaching tentacles.

What USA wants – from India?
US want to play India against China. In their game plan, India may be played against China, the way they played Pakistan against USSR occupation in Afghanistan. Obviously, it cannot be a similar game. In fact, it may turn-out to be dramatically different play given the decades old trust-deficit India and USA have. Yet, that is what US will strive to do and in fact, it is USA’s play as is visible in various announcements and actions by US in recent years.

The Indian Response and Play
India cannot be to China what Pakistan is to India. The key question however is and we need to answer this – in the quest of China becoming a “superpower” – whatever type of power they may call themselves, and the decline of influence of US (and West), what is it that India should do? If we are not impacted, we should definitely ignore US, China, Russia and Europe’s actions in the global geo-political game. However, in the globalizing world, with so many “butterfly effects”, India cannot be a mute witness alone.

As a nation, India needs to become a Robust Nation. Indian nation has been divided in the last 70 years or so in 3 parts, already. The next 50 years are actually ours for the taking – given the demographic relative youth that India will have compared to the rest of the world. If this young energy goes in serving the west or reacting to the Pakistan/China, the next 50 years will be eaten up. India’s potential will remain untapped and will be destroyed. We need to make a “Robust Nation”. That means a nation maintaining its key functions that it needs to perform to meet its developmental objectives despite internal and external perturbations. This requires that India should function reliably as a nation, despite having unreliable components/constituents and perturbations in its environment.

“The Robust Nation” – is the key architectural construct for India. We have the key mechanisms and principles to build robust India. Compared to others, for example, USA has used a system design approach to design a nation with reliable components – almost like a perfect machine with perfect sub-systems. China is using “very quick” surgery of replacing/eliminating non-performing components – by continuously being on the guard and carrying and using its scalpel or dagger as the case may be. Both these design principles are successful when the world is closer to being predictable or certain. In the environment of large scale changes, evolution with robustness is the natural design principle. It requires diversity of components combined together in more or less loosely coupled operational principles.

India has inherited unreliable components in its diversity with uneven development. That arguably may be the reason for our bifurcation in 1947 and also further division in 1971. The three divisions of India are similar to the state India was in before British came or even before Mughals came – a group of small kingdoms, existing together yet fighting with each other from time to time. So one school of thought being propagated – hope that is not the predominant logic in the Indian psyche is – since India has not functioned as a unified nation on its own – accept by the Ashoka the Great and then later only by outsiders such as Mughals and British, why should we even consider a possibility that we will be able to function as an integrated nation in future. Let Chinese come and grab whatever they want. Let USA take whatever they want and let west divide us into “many” “bites” that are more manageable by Big powers. Since, that is our destiny there is no point in being in any competition with Rising China or Mighty US.

India needs to give itself a Chance – Making a Robust Nation
Let us give ourselves a chance. A possible new way – creating a Robust Nation – where the components of our nation may be unreliable, may fail and may also have extreme errors, but as a nation India becomes reliable. How do we create a “The Robust Nation”? In that we have a unique system of building a Nation that can become a new model – it is not the western model and not the China/Russia Model – it has to be a uniquely Indian – and one can argue the most natural model for a nation that we should see emerging. Having said that, we need to define the robust nation model and then of course create those systems that allow us to function with unreliable components.

A robust system doesn’t imply an unchanging system. In fact, robustness implies ability to change in a manner that maintains the system function, sometimes evolve through creation of new functions by changing its system components and mode of operation in a flexible manner. An adaptive structure is the key to responding to such perturbations. Robustness is a fundamental feature of living systems. Evolution requires robustness; in fact, natural systems if they have to evolve need to be robust. However, robust systems face fragility and just good enough performance to evolve. To understand robustness we need to look at stable states of a system. The stable state is state of the system that maintains itself in specific environmental conditions. The fragility of system components or their chaotic nature may be balanced through higher level layers of minimum control and adaptation. However, if the stable state is attacked by random changes that are unknown or unprecedented – the system moves to a new stable state without losing its key functionality. It may do so by re-arranging its system components, creating new system components, changing its mode of operation or doing all of the above. The key is to return to the previous stable state or move to a new stable state without compromising on its key functions. The stable states are called ATTRACTORS in chaos theory.

Can India Evolve?
USA’s “shaping the world” as per its fickle national interests and its expectation from India for becoming a key element of Asian Pivot, India has to evaluate from its own national interests. However, in trying to avoid being USA’s front against China, we should not give away too much to China, Pakistan and others. An approach based on real facts on the grounds and our clear “interests” is essential. We need to be proactive rather than reactive. China is playing out its strategy of being a “new type of super power”. Is there an Indian blueprint of what we want to be? If we define that, we will see that collaboration with both powers – the rising as well as declining superpower has to be looked at very cautiously. In this constrained situation, one option is for India to develop into a practical chameleon. – a capability India has not been able to develop – although Pakistan has always been able to do demonstrate that capability. Further, since India cannot be in any of the black and white partitions, we need a set of capabilities and actions that give us more degrees of freedom than is being allowed as of now. With every passing day, with every new event, which China is playing out along with what US is doing, our degrees of freedom is being slowly but surely being reduced. China is not really the “holy Businessman” that is being projected. There are clear geo-political designs that are emerging. The development of many sea-ports in Pakistan, Srilanka, Mynamaar, etc, ostensibly to reach to Africa faster, better and in an optimal manner may have hidden dimensions to it that will start emerging in future. When the Chinese business interests are in conflict with business interests of USA – the chances of conflict increase. However, as was seen during the cold-war era, superpowers do not come eyeball to eyeball. They play with their fronts. USA is hoping India will be that front and China believes India is just a weak nuisance, in its game plan, to be milked for resources and markets and always kept of tight leash by teaching lessons through military and diplomatic bullying.

India need to penetrate smokescreens of China and USA and may be need to create its own response structure with long-term views. Indian Media, especially TV journalists are ill-equipped to put a comprehensive effort to understand. However, whoever actually creates the Indian response and influences Indian long-term plan needs to think very deep about what India should be doing. Last year I wrote the requirements of an “Indian algorithm“. I think, we need to build a Robust Nation with non-robust components – a uniquely Indian way of organization and creation. Evolvable Systems – for example living species – are robust and evolvable. Collaborative diversity that has been our architecture is a uniquely Indian way, compared to point-based approaches of US and China.

In my opinion, that model of collaborative diversity that India has practiced will lead to an evolutionary robustness – just like a living organism. However, this model that India is practicing and proposing will not be accepted by US as well as China. Yet, this is the natural model. India however, need to create an evolutionary mechanism that results in reaching the same stable state or moving to new stable states with each superpower and internally as well. India should think very deeply before getting into the emerging cold war between due to China containment by US and Chinese assertiveness in the world. Let’s be prepared.

Navneet Bhushan (Navneet) is a founder director of CRAFITTI CONSULTING (www.crafitti.com) – an Innovation and Intellectual Property Consulting firm focused on co-crafting Innovation in global enterprises. He is the winner of Indira India Innovation award for Entrepreneurship and Innovation Leadership for 2012. He is the principal author of Strategic Decision Making- Applying the Analytic Hierarchy Process published by Springer-Verlag, UK, as part of the Decision Engineering Series. Read Navneet Bhushan Profile. Read Navneet Bhushan Columns.

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The Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity, 1993 signed during the visit of Father of Modern India and Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao to China, has the first reference to the airspace violations. Both sides agreed to ‘ensure’ that airspace violations do not take place and mutual consultation in case intrusions occur.

Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in the military field along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas was signed on 29th November 1996 during the tenure of Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao. Article V of the agreement deals with the prevention of air intrusions over the LAC and also sets tone for over flights and landings by military aircraft.

As per the clause, the two sides should prevent air space violations. If at all there is an intrusion, it should be immediately stopped and investigated by the erring side and notified to the other side through diplomatic channels or at border meets. Combat aircraft’s like bomber, reconnaissance, armed helicopters, training aircraft and other type of armed aircraft’s shall not fly within ten kilometers of the LAC. If at all, a military aircraft has to be flown within 10 km of AC, then the other side should be notified. Such flights should not be for more than 10 days. The notification will include type, number, flight height in meters, duration, timings and area along with longitude and latitude. Unarmed transport aircraft, survey aircraft and helicopter can fly up to LAC. Military flights along LAC, over flights is permissible only after obtaining permission from the other side and accordance to International laws. Both nations reserve sovereign right to specify additional conditions like short notice over its own side of LAC or and airspace. In case of emergency, the two countries can get in touch by the quickest means of communication.

Article 3 of Protocols on CBM’s along the LAC, 2005, brings in additional points in case of an airspace violation. In case of airspace violation, a flag meeting will be held within 48 hours and the erring country should submit a report through a Flag Meeting within a period of four weeks.

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The face-to-face term was first used in 1996 agreement. The two countries signed an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual Control in the India – China Border on 7th September 1993 during the visit of Father of Modern India and then Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao to Beijing. Later Confidence Building Measures (CB) in the military field along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas was signed on 29th November 1996 during the visit of Chinese President Ziyang Zemin to New Delhi.

India China Border Meeting in progress, 2006. Image: MoD

Article VII in the agreement envisages maintenance and expansion of the regime of scheduled and flag meetings between the border representatives at designated places along the line of actual control; maintenance and expansion of telecommunication links between the border meeting points at designated places along the line of actual control; and establishment of step-by-step medium and high-level contacts between the border authorities of the two sides.

There are exceptions to the above guidelines. Article VIII deals with crossing of LAC incase of unavoidable circumstances like natural disasters. The modalities of return of the concerned personnel shall be settled through mutual consultations. The exchange of information on unavoidable circumstances shall take place either through diplomatic channels or at border personnel meetings.

The LAC itself is defined by consultations. Article X deals with common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas.

The modalities for the implementations of Confidence Building Measures in the military field along the LAC in the India-China border areas signed on 11 April 2005, during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to New Delhi. The 2005 agreement builds upon the 1996 agreement, but does not contain more measures specific to face-to face situations.

There are mechanisms for addressing air intrusions, which will be dealt in a separate article.

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The 1975 October 11 cable shows that a SAAB-Scania had sent a proposal US embassy for proposed sale of the aircraft to India. “Saab-Scania apparently has permission from the Swedish Government to proceed with a response to the request for proposal.

“As a prime contractor, Saab has been asked by the Indians to obtain the necessary permits from the United States to export those parts of the Viggen that originate in the U.S. or are built in Sweden on license. Principal of these parts is the engine, a modified Pratt & Whitney JT8D, manufactured on license by Volvo Fly Motor. There are additionally, quite a number of electronic and mechanical components to the aircraft which are of U.S. manufacture.”

Robert Strausz-Hupé, the US ambassador to Sweden had supported the proposed sale. He wrote in the cable “I support a Viggen sale to India as long as it does not stand in the way of an American product, because 1) the maintenance of a vigorous Swedish defense industry, and 2) the diversification of Indian defense procurement and, hence, lessened Indian dependence on Soviet Union lie in our interest.”

1975 November 15 cable reveals that Swedish Government was not keen on a sale to India. “It should be noted that we have no firm assurance at this point that GOS (Government of Sweden) itself would necessarily approve sale of Viggen to India; nor do we know extent to which Swedish military would wish to see aircraft avionics downgraded,” states the cable.

The 1975 November 14 document quotes Kissinger ” Since it looks as if GOI (Government of India) may in any case be inclined toward Jaguar, we would like to defer formal USG decision on Viggen sale in order to minimize possible damage to our relations with both India and Sweden in event we would decide not to approve.”

Noting that “to best of our knowledge, we have no veto on sale of British – French Jaguar to India,” Henry Kissinger said that No policy decision has been taken on this case yet, but the fact that we have been unwilling to sell sophisticated combat aircraft to Pakistan would have significant bearing.”He asked US Embassy in Sweden to discourage sending a Proposal to India, using technical points as an excuse.”

1975 November 19 cable shows that the British were agreeable to give credit for sales to India. “A British high commission officer told us november 19 that the British Jaguar is still very much in the running in the Indian Air Force (IAF) sweepstakes.

“London has now decided to offer the government of India a more favorable financing arrangement, 7 1/4 percent over five years, than was earlier the case. The GOI has asked for two percent over 15 years, but the British tell us this is impossible. The GOI still wants 40 aircraft to be delivered within 36 months. The original British offer was 60 months, but they are now talking in terms of 40 odd months….The British still believe they have the best product and remain the favorite of the iaf, but they acknowledge the Viggen remains in competition,” reads the cable.

Mi-23 is the frontrunner says 1975 December 19 cable, “on the question of a new fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force, (reftel), De Bonnecurse said it was not expected that a decision will have been made before Chirac’s visit. In fact, Chirac hopes to be able to boost sales prospects for the Mirage F-1 during his visit. On the basis of available information, the Mig-23 appears to be the frontrunner, De Bonnecorse said. He said this is true for both Political and financial reasons. The GOF (Government of France) is now debating two tactical options De Bonnecorse indicated– place full weight behind the mirage, or switch to the Jaguar in the hope that combined British and French influence will prevail. There is a body of opinion in the GOF which argues that the “British lobby” in India is influential, and that the only chance for defeating the Mig lies in a joint Anglo-French Effort. DeBbonnecorse said that Indian Air Force pilots are currently in France test flying the Mirage.”

1976 January 16 cable explains the sales details of Viggen. “The Swedes here are once again optimistic about their chances of selling the Viggen to the Indian Air Force. The Saab Scania sales manager and the chief technical advisor, the former acting commander of the Swedish Air Force, returned to New Delhi ten days ago for conferences with the Indians. The technical advisor is still here and will remain as long as necessary to handle questions from the new Indian defense minister and new IAF chief of the staff, both of whom according to our Swedish colleague, require time to brief themselves on the competing fighters.

“The Swedes here expect that the iaf will send a test pilot to Sweden to fly the Viggen since the current models coming off the line are airworthy. He tells us the Indians have accepted the explanation for the wing structural defect which temporarily grounded the early models.

The Swedes believe their most telling point, however,is the longevity of the aircraft. They say they have convinced the IAF that the replaceable avionics packages in the Viggen render it capable of periodic modernization with the result that it will be viable until 2000 (which sounds a bit far fetched to us). Our Swedish colleague said the proposal continues to be that the Indians build the airframes and possibly some engines or engine components, but the Swedes provide the avionics. Since the Indians want “the best”, according to our Swedish contact, the IAF regards the avionics as vital. Moreover, the Swedes would not consider Selling the Viggen without the “black boxes.” These factors, The swedes assert, go a long way to offset the disadvantage Of relatively high initial unit cost. Another inducement, As seen by the Swedes here, is that Saab Scania has completed its survey of indian exports and concluded it could market several items in sweden or the west making a barter type arrangement at least feasible from the swedish point of view.

“The swedish foreign minister is due on a visit to New Delhi circa March 1. The swedes are braced for another indian appeal for credit which our colleague says sweden will not grant, but he did say the minister would strongly support the viggen sale. Our colleague would not say what other concessions the swedes may be considering.”

Another 1976 January 16 cable details the final race for the Indian Air Force Deep penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA) purchase. “within the past week British high commissioner Michael Walker has spoken to defence minister Bansi Lal about the Jaguar. Lal wanted precise figures on terms, prices, delivery dates for the Jaguar. The defence minister also told the British that the French Mirage was still very much in competition, and that he anticipated a new French offer. Sir Michael intends to see defence secretary Kohli in the near Future and say that Britain is prepared to deliver the first 20 to 24 aircraft on credit, the terms to be five years at 6 1/2 to 8 1/2 percent. The British will deliver the maximum number 24, only if the French concur in the credit arrangement.

“the French believe their chances are still excellent French prime minister Chirac will discuss the matter with Mrs Gandhi during his visit, January 23 to 26, but the French embassy here does not expect the matter to be resolved during that visit. The French understand the Indian team was pleased by the results of their visit to France, but more and more the French embassy here is convinced that it is Prime Minister Gandhi alone who will make the final decision, which the french assert will be on political grounds. Our French embassy contact again repeated the French assessment That the Soviets are very much in the running and are energetically pushing the late model mig aircraft. The French see some mix in the Indian selection as as possible. The French also believe the Swedes have reduced their prices and offered to take rupees in payment, but our French contact could not or would not give the basis for this conclusion.”

British and french agree for credit and competition from MiG-21B shows 1976 February 9 cable, “the French minister-counselor likewise told the ADCM Feb 9 she (Indira Gandhi) did not think time was a pressing factor. (the French air attaché circa jan 28 told our assistant air attaché the IAF decision was at least three months away.) She added that during his visit prime minister Chirac told the Indian ..the French would offer identical credit terms for the jaguar or the Mirage F-1, but it was for the Indians to decide which plane they preferred. She, however, has some doubts as to the indian intention to acquire a new aircraft. The counselor also reported that the French embassy heard the GOI has already placed an order for Mig-21B’s. We have no confirming information on this report, but have heard similar stories from third-country attaches as well as from the soviet air attaché. We do not believe any Mig-21 deal, assuming report are accurate, would in any event be seen by the iaf as a substitute for the western fighter, but as replacements for old IAF Mig-21s whose air frame life-expectancy is exhausted.”

On 1976 May 18 cable says that SAAB-Scania submitted a formal proposal to embassy stating that the model to be sold to India equivalent to older generation and the technologies was of 1950′s and 60′s. The company also warned of India evaluating a Soviet aircraft. “Saab-Scania wants to stress that the aircraft Viggen 37VA is an older, first-generation Viggen, not equivalent to the lastest version 37JA.., that the components belong to the 1950 and early 1960′s, that the aircraft and its components are not at the most advanced technology level and involve a low level of military secrecy…..“The government of India says it will not enter into contractual relations with SAAB-Scania without knowing that the necessary us authorizations will be forthcoming.

“Indian Air Force pilots will come to Sweden (Linkoping) in early June to test-fly the Viggen.

“The Soviet Union has entered the competition to provide India with an attack aircraft (which the Saab-Scania officials were unable to identify specifically),” states the cable.

The same cable sates that Swedish Government was not averse to the potential sale. “In separate but related moves, Swedish MFA officials have furnished embassy with somewhat contradictory indications re Swedish position. Deputy director for political affairs Thyberg advised DCM that Swedish government’s position is more nuanced than the negative position he said was incorrectly voiced to defense department officials in April by visiting deputy minister of defense Ulf larsson. The Swedish government “has no objection,” he said, to Saab-Scania’s proposals for initial deliveries and gradual transfer of production capability, but future deliveries would always be contingent on “circumstances prevailing at the time.”

“GOS has also advised the GOI that the GOS could not provide the same kind of assurances of future deliveries which sweden was ready to provide potential NATO purchasers of the Viggen,” states the cable.

SAAB-Scania tried to differentiate the Viggen Models that will be sold to India in order to secure US nod. 1976 August 4 cable notes ” We also believe that SAAB-Scania’s efforts to make a significant distinction between current A-J 37 aircraft and the modified version “37VA” which would be the system provided to India are unrealistic. The configuration list provided (Stockholm 2807) contains only equipment which falls into the normal airframe category. It does not indicate the military subsystems which would give the aircraft a combat capacity. We would have to know what military subsystems are to be included with this attack version in order to make a complete evaluation of the technological sensitivity. In our opinion, SAAB-Scania could not build in a reasonable time and at a reasonable cost an export attack version of the Viggen without continuing to use classified us technology or equipment for the military subsystems.”

US Embassy on 1976 August 6 notes backing out by the Swedish Government, “They have also stressed that sale of Viggen to India was of secondary consideration to them, in comparison with value of military cooperation with U.S. Both Anders Thunborg, Secretary of State and Chairman of Royal Defense Commission, and Knut Thyberg, MFA official responsible for arms exports, have made this point to me and to senior members of my staff. The fact that approach to the embassy on possible export of Viggen to India was made by SAAB-Scania and not by Swedish Government, reflected not only reluctance of GOS to sell Viggen to India but also determination of GOS not to take any action which would jeopardize our cooperative relationship.”

On 1976 August 6, the US Embassy cable states that SAAB-SCANIA President Curt Mileikowsky was told “After careful consideration, has concluded that no version of the Viggen containing any classified U.S. Components would be acceptable for transfer to India. I said USG would also oppose any transfer to India, for local production, of the advanced U.S. Technology represented in the Viggen’s aerodynamic design, engine and flying controls, navigation system, electronic components and weapons systems.” The embassy said a negative response can be anticipated if formal Swedish Government sent a formal request to US.

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