Agni-1 against Chinese occupied Tibet
The Agni-1 test by the army this month sends a signal more to the Chinese than to Pakistan. While Indian missile development follows its own schedules, it is a welcome change that the Agni-1 was tested during the unrest in Tibet, rather than pander to Chinese security concerns.
The Kargil war brought home the stark reality that India does not has a tactical deterrent to the Chinese who occupy Tibet and threaten India with its missiles stationed there. As the then COAS, General V.P. Malik wrote in his book ‘Kargil - from surprise to victory’,
the China made a demonstrative support to Pakistan at the height of the conflict that its forces almost sparked off a stand-off on the Sino-Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh. The People’s Liberation army deployed troops in temporary posts in Chantze in West Kameng district, resulting in a military standoff in the first week of July 1999 as Indian forces were in full scale operations to evict intruding Pakistani troops from the Kargil heights. Chinese had inducted one company in the area opposite Chantze, with the rest of the battalion waiting in the wings. It was not only at Kameng, but the Chinese army enhanced its level of activity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh as well from where some of the forces had been thinned down to be redeployed in Kargil. This enhancement in PLA activities along the LAC coincided with the start of the conflict in Kargil.
It ran contrary to Beijing’s assertions in recent years that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy and that its relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of India. The Chinese forces also made a show of force in Demchok, in eastern Ladakh, constructed a track from Spanggur to south end of Pangong lake and a track in Trigg heights. The stand-off at Chantze continued throughout the Kargil crisis till the Chinese agreed to dismantle the additional temporary posts created and withdrew the troops by end of September. India also received intelligence reports that PLA’s Director in the Department of Armament had visited Islamabad during the conflict to help Pakistan army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.
Lack of road communication and vulnerability at Trigg Heights did not give us a particularly comfortable military posture,” The Indian forces had increased vigilance to match the PLA patrolling to make sure that operational situation on the Sino-Indian border was not permitted to escalate.
The Agni-1 tactical rationale
After discussions on the need for a 250 to 900 km range missile, in October 1999, it was agreed to develop, test and produce the Agni-I. The road-mobile, solid propelled Agni-1 is ideal to be deployed at the border between India and Chinese occupied Tibet (CoT), where there is no availability of rail lines.
The first trial of the Agni-1 missile was carried out from the Wheelers Island on January 25, 2002. The 15 m long, solid fueled missile, with weight of about 12 tonnes is capable of delivering warheads of 1 ton. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002-2003 demonstrated the effectiveness of long range missile strikes. This pushed the Prithvi Missile designers to look for options beyond the Prithvi’s set range. The motor casing was replaced with lighter, stronger composite ones and a number of other improvements were introduced. In April 2003, an extended range Prithvi flew beyond the barrier milestone. But the range improvement was still not enough. Hence the need for the Agni-I. Smaller size increases the flexibility of the Agni logistics chain. An Indian Air force IL-76 aircraft can airlift at least 2 Agni-1 missiles to Arunachal Pradesh or any other part of the country. Conservatively an IL-76 can air lift the dismantled Agni-1 Mobile launchers too. This will allow for rapid redeployment of missile assets in case of urgent requirements.
Agni-1 for China in occupied Tibet (CoT)
The next war with China will not remain a border war that will be fought on Tibetian borders. The southern most border of CoT falls at the tri border of India, Bhutan and Tibet. The northern most border of Tibet is Mt. Ulugh Mustagh. The distance between the two places is approximately 1100 km. Tsethang, the Chinese district HQ in Tibet, is 503 km from Bunmla in Arunachal Pradesh.
India will have to strike deep at Chinese air bases, railway lines, supply chains, military camps and missile installations deep inside Tibet. The Prithvi will not be enough for this requirement, while the Agni-II will be a dangerous provocation. However, the Agni-1 can easily hit any Chinese base in Tibet from within Indian borders. A single stage tactical missile like Agni-1 which is under 1000 km range will not evoke suspicion of a nuclear strike within Tibetian borders. The Agni-I will make an ideal long range tactical strike missile, and will certainly be a powerful addition to Indian weaponry ranged against Chinese forces in occupied Tibet.